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                                                        Abstract 
 
 
Title of dissertation: Review of South Africa’s marine pollution prevention    
                                measures, particularly those regarding vessel-source 
                                oil pollution 
 
 
Degree:                     Master of Science in Marine Affairs 
 
 
South Africa lies in one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. The peculiar waters of 
South Africa serve to explain the treacherous sailing conditions. The large traffic volume 
transiting around Cape Horn and the large number of ships sailing towards the 
country’s ports makes the coast vulnerable to oil pollution. It is with this view in mind 
that the author of this dissertation will review South Africa’s Marine Pollution Prevention 
Measures, particularly those regarding vessel-source oil pollution, with emphasis on the 
operational level. 
This dissertation will review and analyse national marine pollution prevention measures 
related to vessel-source oil pollution. Roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders 
will be investigated and analysed. The roles of the DEA and SAMSA will be critically 
reviewed with emphasis on their legal mandates regarding oil pollution prevention and 
responses. The status of Conventions will be examined, as well as their enactment into 
domestic law. A major maritime nation, Sweden, will be studied for purposes of gap 
analysis and review of the lessons that South Africa can learn on vessel-source oil 
pollution measures. 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The tendency for mankind to overstate the ocean’s assimilative ability has generally led 
to exaggerated claims about Marine pollution. Because of the oceans’ vastness, they 
are often perceived as bottomless pits (Nybakken, 2001). The oceans cover almost 
three-quarters of the earth’s surface area, and are comprised of 1.3 billion km3 of water 
(Global Ocean Commission Report, 2014). Little wonder that mankind believed that its 
assimilative ability was infinite and its resources were inexhaustible. 
 
The Law of the Sea Convention defines marine pollution as:  
 
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly of substances or energy into the marine 
environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious 
effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance 
to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of 
quality of use of sea and water and reduction of amenities (UNCLOS, 1982). 
 
Recently, marine environmental protection has been elevated on the agenda to become 
the most important ecological issue of modern times. With the emergence of 
environmental consciousness capturing the world’s attention, so has protection of the 
marine environment (Tan, 2005). This has not only largely been due to new knowledge 
regarding marine pollution but also to people’s greater awareness of the oceans’ 
ecosystem service and economic value (Beaudoin and Pendleton, 2012). The oceans 
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are the world’s largest ecosystem and have a central role in supporting all life on earth. 
They provide a wide variety of services and resources that support humans (Global 
Ocean Commission Report, 2014). As such, preservation of these resources has 
become paramount for the survival of humankind. 
 
Because they make the headlines, major oil spills are the most known form of marine 
pollution, although major oil pollution disasters involving tankers account for only 10% 
of oil pollution of the marine environment (IOI, 2010). Over the last few years, issues 
like rising sea levels and ocean acidification have climbed up the list. The oceans are 
becoming more acidic as their PH continues to drop. The general consensus amongst 
the world’s scientists is that acidification of the oceans is largely due to Greenhouse 
gases (Husley, 2012). Microplastics have also gained attention from scientists over the 
last few years. It was discovered that, with repeated exposure to wave action, saltwater 
and solar radiation, plastics break down into microplastics that continue to exist in the 
marine environment for years (International Ocean Institute, 2010). Most problems 
related to the oceans are of anthropogenic origin. Anthropogenic sourced marine 
pollution includes discharges from land-based sources, ships, atmospheric deposition, 
ocean dumping and offshore oil and gas installations (Tan, 2005:.3). 
 
Indeed, 80% of discharges into the marine environment are land-based marine pollution 
(Global Ocean Commission, 2013). Land-based sources of marine pollution can be 
further divided into point and non-point sources. Point sources include industrial effluent 
pipes, industrial stack emissions and municipal sewage and waste water pipes with 
non-point sources originating from diffused sources such agricultural runoffs. 
 
A lot of resources have been committed by the international community to curbing land-
based marine pollution, particularly since the strain that is exerted on the marine 
environment by anthropogenic pollution is beginning to show in many coastal waters 
around the world. Population growth and rapid economic development are the major 
drivers. The increasing strain on the marine environment is becoming apparent with 
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more and more hypoxic areas discovered in many coastal waters around the world. 
Around 500 hypoxic zones have been reported around the world and are currently 
threatening areas of critical ecological importance (STAP, 2011). Hypoxia results from 
nutrient over-enrichment of coastal waters through a process called eutrophication. 
 
Vessel-sourced pollution is by no means an insignificant contributor to marine pollution. 
Global trade continues to grow and, with the global merchant fleet seating at over 
50,000, vessel-source-pollution cannot be ignored (International Ocean Institute, 2010). 
The impact of ships on the environment is considerable. Major vessel source pollution 
consists of garbage, air emissions, sewage, ballast water, and accidental and 
operational oil pollution. Oil and cargo residues leave traces in the marine environment, 
while air emissions have introduced high values of sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides and 
particulate matter (Vidas and Schei, 2011). 
 
Ballast water is another issue that is currently high on the list of not only the shipping 
fraternity, but also marine environmentalists worldwide. There is strong evidence 
showing that certain species have been transferred from one region to another through 
ship’s ballast water (Vidas and Schei, 2011). Studies in Europe have revealed that 
more than 1,000 non-indigenous aquatic species have been recorded across Europe’s 
coastal waters. The species were also found in the navigational inland waterways used 
by ocean-going vessels. These species have been problematic as they have a negative 
effect on indigenous species through predation and competition which leads to changes 
in the ecosystem (Vidas and Schei, 2011). 
                                
Vessel-source pollution continues to be a threat to the environment. Major oil spills are 
not the only culprits but operational discharges, which include a deliberate element, are 
a continuous threat as well. Major oil spills will make the news and often resources 
including oil spill responses are put in place immediately to prevent damage or further 
damage to the environment. However, with deliberate oil spills that can occur 
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anywhere, and with culprits escaping detection, the effects of these types of pollution 
can be devastating to the marine environment.  
 
1.2. Objectives 
 
South Africa lies in one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. South African waters are 
known to provide some of the world’s treacherous sailing conditions, with vessels prone 
to encountering structural damages, thus making the waters vulnerable to oil pollution. 
It is with this in mind that the author will review South Africa’s Marine Pollution 
prevention measures, particularly those regarding vessel-source oil pollution with 
emphasis on the operational level. 
The objectives of this dissertation are: 
 1. To review and analyse National Marine Pollution Prevention Measures that are 
related to     vessel-source oil pollution; 
2. To summarize and assess the responsibilities of different stakeholders, mainly the 
South African Maritime Authority and The National Department of Environmental Affairs 
regarding marine oil pollution by ships; 
3. To review and analyse South Africa's National Contingency Plan for the Prevention 
and Combating of Pollution from Ships and Offshore Installations (SANCP). In addition, 
the author will establish whether relevant IMO Conventions have been ratified; and, 
4. To compare and contrast South Africa’s situation with one of the major Maritime 
nations regarding Marine Pollution Prevention Measures. 
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1.3 Methodology 
 
The methodology used for data collect is qualitative methods. Structured interviews with 
relevant stakeholders, namely, the Department of Environmental Affairs, the 
Department of Transport and the South African Maritime Safety Authority, including its 
wing, the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre were conducted.  
Sweden was chosen for the purposes of gap-analysis. The criterion was to identify a 
major maritime nation with a coast and maritime traffic that is almost similar to South 
Africa. The aim will be to look at Sweden’s oil pollution management and enforcement 
measures to mitigate against vessel source pollution. Good practices will be identified 
and considered as possible recommendations for South Africa to adopt. 
 
1.4 Organization of the dissertation 
 
The study will begin with a broader and general outlook into marine pollution, followed 
by vessel-source marine pollution. Different types of vessel-source marine pollution and 
their effects on the marine environment will be discussed including the regulation 
regime pertaining to vessel-source marine pollution will be discussed. 
The dissertation will then examine vessel-source oil pollution. Operational and 
accidental oil spills will be described and discussed, including the fate and effects of oil 
pollution on the marine environment. Major oil-spill disasters will be identified, with their 
impact and effect on the marine environment briefly discussed. 
South Africa’s marine pollution prevention measures particularly those dealing with 
vessel-source oil pollution will be reviewed and analysed. Ratification of relevant IMO 
and international instruments pertaining to oil pollution will be ascertained. Major oil spill 
incidents, response and effects on the marine environment will be discussed. 
Legislation and policies will be tabulated and reviewed. The role of different 
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stakeholders in ocean governance, particularly related to marine pollution, will be 
reviewed.  Lastly, a major maritime nation for gap analysis will be identified and 
recommendations given. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2. VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION AND ITS EFFECTS 
 
2.1 Pollution  
 
Maritime transport has always been important to people around the world. In the early 
development of modern maritime transport, ships were used for passenger travel. 
However, that market was out-competed by the advent of air travel. Ships are still vitally 
important as they carry goods and the number of merchant vessels grew significantly 
with industrialization and continues to grow (IOI, 2010). The current global trade 
volumes could not be met without the use of maritime transport. Currently around 90% 
of global trade is carried through the sea by the International maritime community 
(Vidas and Schei, 2011). 
Over the years, ships have polluted the marine environment in many forms. Even 
though tanker disasters tend to take the limelight, there are different kinds of vessel-
source pollution which have been found to be equally devastating to the marine 
environment (IOI, 2010). International trade through maritime transport is responsible 
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for many negative effects on the environment. Maritime transport not only pollutes the 
sea but also land and air. Ships, regardless of whether they are at sea or in ports, in 
their normal operations release harmful emissions into the atmosphere through their 
exhaust systems. The fact that ships are manned by human beings means that 
domestic waste is generated by default. Cargo also poses its own conundrum as well 
as paints used on the ship’s hull (Vidas and Schei, 2011). Ships other than tankers 
nowadays carry various hazardous cargoes which pose a threat to the ocean. There 
have been many efforts over the years from the maritime community to put together 
instruments that ensure the ocean and the whole marine environment is preserved and 
protected (Tan, 2005). 
The nature of international maritime transport makes it a trans-jurisdictional industry 
and has led to the maritime industry establishing its own regulations. The regulations 
governed by the international maritime industry have been intense over the years. The 
result has been a decline in the amount of oil and other pollutants entering the oceans 
from ships. It is estimated that between 1973 and 1989 the decline in oil and other 
pollutants entering the oceans from ships was 75% (Tan, 2005). 
 
2.2 Type of vessel – source pollution 
 
Apart from oil pollution, ships generate different kinds of pollution in both the marine 
environmental and the environment in general. Ships carry noxious and harmful 
substances, contaminated ballast water, sewage effluent, domestic and industrial litter, 
air pollution and anti-fouling paints on their hulls (Gold, 2006). Selected types of marine 
pollution currently considered as major environmental issues will be discussed, 
including their effect on the marine environment.  
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2.2.1. OIL POLLUTION 
 
Vessel-source oil pollution can be split into operational and accidental discharges. 
Operational discharges emanate from normal shipboard operations i.e. engine rooms 
and cargo tanks cleaning, while accidental discharges emanate from maritime 
accidents, including major oil spills (Gold, 1998). Pollution through tanker accidents has 
been on the decline since the early 1970s and 1980s. Oil spills and, in general, oil 
inputs into the ocean by tankers have been reduced by 63% from the highs of the 
1980s. Over the same period, oil released from tanker accidents has gone down by 
75% and from tanker operations by 90% (Nellemann, Hain and Alder, 2008). The effect 
of oil pollution will be discussed in chapter 3. 
2.2.2 GABBAGE (SOLID WASTE) 
 
Like households, ships generate a lot of domestic waste and a considerable amount of 
waste from cargo operations. The shipping industry is a major source of marine litter in 
the oceans. Regulations do allow for certain types of waste to be discharged at sea 
under certain conditions which might be contributing to the problem of vessel-source 
pollution. Enforcement at sea is difficult and almost impossible, thus ships can dispose 
of waste in the high seas without repercussions (Vidas and Schei, 2011). Over 110,000 
tonnes of garbage in the United States of America is from ship generated solid waste. 
This includes items that make up household waste such as glass, wood, rubber and 
packing material (Molnar and Koshure, 2009). 
There are many forms of solid waste produced by ships, including plastics. Plastics are 
becoming a major environmental issue with scientists increasingly concerned about the 
potential impact of releases from plastic debris of persistent bio-accumulation and toxic 
compounds (PBTs). PBTs are credited with many health problems in marine life 
including endocrine disruptions, mutagenicity and carcinogenicity. The major sources of 
plastics are land-based, although maritime transport is also a significant contributor. In 
the East Asian region and Southern North Sea, for instance, shipping is listed as a 
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significant contributor of plastic found at sea. On the shipping front, cruise liners, 
merchant shipping and recreational boats are the major culprits. Plastics are not 
biodegradable and are buoyant, remaining in the marine environment for years. 
Through photo-degradation and abrasion, they do, however, break down into smaller 
pieces which are termed microplastics (particles up to 5 millimetres in diameter). The 
danger with microplastics is that they can be consumed by the smaller families of 
marine life (UNEP, 2011; Wabnitz and Nichols, 2010). Plastic has been found in guts of 
leatherback turtles blocking the passage of food. The logical assumption is that turtles 
mistake plastic for jellyfish (Mrosovsky, Ryan and James, 2009). 
2.2.3 ALIEN AND INVASIVE SPECIES 
2.2.3.1 Ballast water 
 
Apart from cargo tanks and bunker fuel tanks, ships are equipped with ballast water 
tanks. Ballast water is taken in especially if the ship is not fully laden or not carrying 
cargo all. This water is used to improve the ship’s stability and sea keeping. 
Ballast water which is collected in another region is often discharged before the ship 
reaches its next port. Clearly, this water can serve as a vector for the introduction of 
alien and invasive species into the new environment (Molnar and Koshure, 2009). 
There are other means by which alien species can be transported from one region to 
another, including natural means, but shipping by the nature of its trade is the major 
contributor as depicted in Figure 2.1. In an example that is often cited, the pacific acts 
as a migration barrier for migration through natural means. The reason is that the 
zooplankton larval phase is too short to allow natural means distribution across the 
pacific. However, ships crisscross the oceans enabling them to transport species from 
one ocean to another. The majority of the species are said to die during the voyage, but 
a number survive, making it into the new environment. A ship’s ballast water can 
contain millions of organisms which, if taken in the context of busy waterways and busy 
ports, can translate to astronomical figures. These alien and invasive species may 
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threaten native species, altering habitats and affecting ecosystem function (Gollasch 
and Nehring, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 1: Invasive species pathways through shipping (Source: Dockwise) 
 
As a result of the negative impact to local ecosystems, the introduction of invasive 
species in some areas has led to economic loss with fisheries collapsing. Clogging of 
water-intake systems in power plants - has also led to increased maintenance costs 
(Vidas and Schei, 2011).   
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2.2.3.2 BIOFOULING 
 
Another form of alien and marine invasive species’ introduction to foreign environments 
is called biofouling. Organisms attach themselves to a ship’s hull and are transported 
from one region to another. Species mostly involved are both calcareous and non–
calcareous; they attach themselves to the hulls of  ships. They not only affect the 
marine environment but are considered a nuisance as they slow down the ship by 
increasing drag (Potters, 2013). 
2.2.4 WASTE WATER AND CONTAMINATED BALLAST TANK RESIDUES 
 
Ships produce black and grey water, the former being sewage effluent while the latter is 
water from kitchen sinks, showers and galleys. Sewage effluent from ships is less 
diluted than municipal sewage as there is less water involved. Modern ships have 
sewage treatment plants, holding tanks or a disinfection system on board. Discharge of 
sewage from plants at sea is regulated by MARPOL. Even before regulation, it was 
standard practice to discharge sewage away from coastal areas. Sewage effluent may 
contribute to eutrophication in busy coastal lanes, affecting the ecosystem which, in 
turn, can affect fisheries, coastal livelihoods and tourism. Grey water contains residues 
from detergents which can be toxic to marine life. Busy coastal lanes with protected 
bays and areas of low tidal exchange are the most vulnerable as polluted water may be 
consumed by species like shellfish leading to food safety problems (Molnar and 
Koshure, 2009). 
Residues from cargo tanks which have been used for ballast purposes are also a 
source of marine pollution. A recent example is the case involving 4,000 dead birds 
(around 18 species altogether) that were washed up on the coast of the English 
Channel in early 2013,covered with a sticky substance. Polyisobutylene, commonly 
referred to in the maritime industry as PIB, was later identified as the sticky substance 
that covered the seabirds and affected their mobility, rendering them unable to feed. 
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This oil additive is released into the sea during tank-cleaning and during discharges of 
polluted water from tanks. Until recently, it was permissible to release PIB into the sea 
under determined conditions as per MARPOL (UK Chamber of Shipping, RSPB, MCS, 
RSPCA, The Wild Life Trust, 2014). Polyisobutylene is a hydrophobic substance which, 
when in contact with water, coalesces into a waxy glue-like formation. Various seabird 
species which dive into the water for food are particularly vulnerable. After a concerted 
effort from wildlife conservation organizations and maritime organizations to push for a 
total ban of PIB, IMO agreed to reclassify it. The IMO’s Working Group on the 
Evaluation of Safety and Pollution Hazards of Chemicals has since agreed to classify 
high-viscosity PIB as category x for carriage by ships. This means that PIB will be 
prohibited for discharge at sea. Effective implementation is projected for 2016 (UK 
Chamber of Shipping, RSPB, MCS, RSPCA, The Wild Life Trust, 2014).  
2.2.5 EMISSIONS 
 
Merchant ships generally use Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) for engine propulsion. HFO is a 
blend of refinery residue. HFO is considered dirty oil because of lack of refinement. It 
emits high concentrations of Sulphur Oxide (SOX) and Nitrogen Oxide (NOX), 
particulate matter and Carbon dioxide (CO2). Shipping total fuel consumption was 
estimated at 369 million tonnes in 2007 and was predicted to rise to 486 million tonnes 
by 2020 (Vidas and Schei, 2011). CO2 emissions in this same period were estimated at 
1,015 million tonnes, meaning that shipping in general contributes 3.3% of global 
emissions. In 2007, international shipping contributed 870 million tonnes, corresponding 
to 2.7% of the global total. Looking from outside shipping, this might seem like a small 
percentage; however, this industry has a lot of room for improvement which includes 
among others substitution of Heavy Fuel Oil with cleaner fuel (Bazari and Longva, 
2011). 
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2.2.6 Antifouling paints 
 
Ships use anti-fouling paints in their hulls which prevent marine organisms from 
attaching to the hull and affecting the speed of the ship by increasing drag, resulting in 
higher fuel consumption. Anti-fouling paints containing tributyl tin (TBT) were the 
preferred choice for painting the underside of ships from the 1970s. They were 
regarded as effective biocides (Tan, 2006). 
TBT is arguably the most toxic substance ever to be introduced into natural waters 
deliberately (Steward and Thompson 1994; Molnar and Koshure, 2009). TBT causes 
imposex in mollusks which leads to rapid population decline as reproduction is inhibited 
(Molnar and Koshure, 2009). 
2.2.7 Noise 
 
Noise pollution is normally associated with the noise ships make while in port. However, 
recent studies and cases have shown that noise from ships while at sea has negative 
impacts on marine mammals. In March 2000 a pod of whales suffered traumatic injuries 
and became stranded in the Bahamas. A total of 14 beaked whales and 2 minke whales 
were stranded and 6 of the beaked whales died. The cause was later traced to the US 
Navy’s use of mid-range sonar. Studies on the effects of anthropogenic noise on 
mammals like beaked whales are continuing (Cox, Ragen, Read, Vos and Baird, 2006). 
 
2.3 Legal regime and international instruments 
 
The maritime industry was already conscious of the considerable negative impact of 
ships on the marine environment as early as the beginning of the 21st century. By the 
1970s, environmental consciousness within the industry was gaining momentum and 
culminated in the establishment of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
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Sea (SOLAS) in 1974 (Vidas and Schei, 2011). However, the revolution had actually 
begun a few years earlier in 1926 during the International Conference in Washington. 
The conference that was attended by representatives of 13 maritime States produced 
the first international convention relating to oil pollution of the marine environment. The 
convention might not have been ratified but was a step in the right direction (Gold, 
2006). 
Several attempts were made in subsequent years at regulating vessel source pollution  
but none were successful. In 1948, a Maritime Conference was convened in Geneva by 
the UN and the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) was 
established. IMCO was the precursor to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
(Tan, 2006). The rising world economy in the 1950s which came with huge demand for 
oil prompted the stakeholders to look at the pollution problem again. In 1954, another 
milestone was reached with the conclusion of the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) (Gold, 2006). 
In 1958 and 1960, the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea was held. Marine pollution 
did not feature much on the agenda during both conferences. The subsequent UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea held in 1973 and 1982, resulting in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), saw the elevation of the marine 
pollution issue. In the 1970s, there was growing consciousness about marine pollution 
with a number of international conferences aimed at protection of the marine 
environment by regulating vessel-source pollution. In 1973 an instrument to combat 
marine pollution, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL 73), was established. MARPOL was to become the flagship marine pollution 
Convention. It came out of IMCO International Conference on Marine Pollution held in 
the same year. MARPOL superseded the regime established by OILPOL 54 and 
MARPOL unlike OILPOL 54, which dealt only with oil, covered all aspects of pollution 
from ships (Tan, 2006).  
The International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on ships 
was adopted in 2001.This Convention prohibits use of harmful organotins in antifouling 
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paints and establishes a mechanism to prevent the potential future use of other harmful 
substances (IMO, 2001). In 2011 the IMO member States agreed on technical 
regulations aimed at reducing shipping CO2 emissions and entered into force in 
January 2013 as an amendment to MARPOL. The measures consist of a system of 
energy efficiency design index (EEDI) for new builds. The IMO EEDI is expected to 
ensure an estimated 25-30% reduction in emissions by 2030. There is also the Ship 
Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) to be used by all ships. The SEEMP 
relates to operational measures that can be taken to reduce CO2 emissions during 
operation of ships currently in service (ICS, 2013). Establishment of Emission control 
areas in North America and Europe sees giant steps towards cleaner ships.  
The maritime industry under the IMO has adopted a number of self-regulatory 
instruments over the years, with the ship owners feeling the pinch. The instruments 
demand huge capital investments and the cost of compliance has become a major part 
of the business of shipping. The measures to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions and 
the Ballast Water Management Convention will result in increases in costs amounting to 
trillions of US dollars. The shipping industry needs to be commended as these 
measures are the first to be adopted industry wide (ICS, 2014).  
 
2.4 Summary 
 
Ships have a major impact on the marine environment. They produce a variety of 
pollutants ranging from litter, to greenhouse gases and ballast water. In the beginning, 
oil pollution by tankers was seen as the only main threat and the maritime States’ early 
deliberations focused solely on it. However, in the 1970s environmental consciousness 
gained momentum, culminating in the adoption of MARPOL, which has a wider scope 
covering all aspects of technical pollution by ships. 
The establishment of IMCO, the precursor to the IMO, propelled the development of 
self-regulatory instruments by the maritime Nations working with the shipping industry. 
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Shipping being a trans-jurisdictional industry needed a supranatural body to govern and 
regulate its operations. The IMO, a specialized agency of the United Nations with 170 
member States, has filled that gap. The instruments adopted over the years have 
ensured that the impact on the marine environment is minimized. Notwithstanding this, 
it is important to note that the complicated nature of ocean governance as envisaged by 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea makes enforcement difficult. 
The shipping industry continues to grow, and more ships are being built, which might 
mean more threats. However, the outlook is more positive as new builds are set to fall 
in line with EEDI;  ships of the future are expected to be more environmentally friendly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: VESSEL-SOURCE OIL POLLUTION 
 
Whenever vessel-source pollution is mentioned, oil pollution springs to mind. Indeed, oil 
pollution of the marine environment has been the subject of many International 
conferences and conventions for almost a decade. The spectacular sinking of a tanker 
spilling thousands of tonnes of crude oil will always grab the public and law makers’ 
attention and the condemnation of the shipping industry never ends. However, in 
practice, vessel-source oil pollution is not the major source of pollution in the ocean. Big 
oil tanker disasters account for 10 percent of global marine pollution (IOI, 2010). 
Vessel-source oil pollution can be divided into operational and accidental discharges. 
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3.1 Accidental discharges 
 
Accidental discharges were perceived early by the maritime nations as the major threat 
to the marine environment. As tankers were getting bigger and crude oil demand grew, 
the thought of a major disaster involving an oil tanker weighed heavily on the minds of 
the maritime states. Shortly after World War I, the United States and the League of 
Nations sought an international agreement on measures to combat vessel-source oil 
pollution. However, it was not until 1926 that the first convention relating to oil pollution 
of the sea was introduced (Gold, 2006). This was the beginning of concerted efforts to 
combat vessel-source oil pollution, which continued well into World War II and beyond, 
and culminated in the conclusion of the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL).  
As mentioned in chapter 2, oil pollution of the oceans has been on the decline from the 
1970s and 1980s. From the highs of the 1980s, oil spills and general discharges by 
tankers have been reduced by 63% and, significantly, over the same period, oil 
released from tanker accidents has gone down by 75% (Nellemann, Hain and Alder, 
2008).  
3.1.1 MAJOR OIL TANKER DISASTERS 
 
Accidental discharges from ships cannot only happen through tanker disasters, but also 
through cargo ship accidents that cause the release of bunker oils. The amount might 
seem relatively small, but an accident occurring in coastal waters can have a huge 
impact on the marine environment. There have been a number of big oil tanker 
disasters, some big by volume of oil released and others by impact on the marine 
environment. During the period 1970 to 2013, approximately 5.75 million tonnes of oil 
was lost due to tanker incidents (ITOPF, 2013). 
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Some of these accidents were a catalyst for the development of maritime safety and 
environmental protection regulations/conventions. A selected number of the major oil 
pollution disasters will be discussed below (and for a full list see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Major oil spills since 1967 (Source: IOPF) 
 
i. In 1967, Torrey Canyon, carrying almost 120,000 tonnes of crude oil, 
grounded off Scilly Island in the UK. The area of the spill covered an arc of 
321 km.  At the time, it was the largest oil spill in maritime history and had 
unprecedented media coverage and garnered a lot of public interest. The 
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magnitude of the disaster, coupled with extensive media coverage, played a 
role in influencing public opinion (Gold, 2006). 
 
ii. The grounding of the Exxon Valdez in 1989, which spilt about 36, 000 
tonnes of oil (crude) in Alaska's Prince William Sound, caused devastating 
damage to the marine environment. This incident might not seem huge in 
comparison to the tonnes of oil released by other big maritime disasters, but 
it occurred in a very sensitive area. It is estimated that 250,000 seabirds, 
300 harbour seals and 900 bald seals were killed and marine life continued 
to suffer years after the disaster (National Research Council, 2007). This 
incident had a great influence on the improvement of maritime navigational 
aids as well as phasing out of single hull tankers. MARPOL was amended 
after the incident and double hull designs were introduced. Single hull 
tankers are expected to be phased out by 2015 (ICS, 2014). Exxon's total 
costs for compensation payments of about US$ 5 billion are still the subject 
of litigation even today. Exxon is also believed to have spent a similar 
amount on the clean-up operations. The cost of this incident has been very 
high to the marine environment as well as the maritime industry (ICS, 2014). 
 
iii. The largest of the oil spill disasters involving a tanker in history was the 
Atlantic Empress incident in 1979. The Atlantic Empress was a Very Large 
Crude Carrier (VLCC), with a deadweight (DWT) of 250,000. It collided with 
another VLCC the Aegean Captain off the coast of Trinidad and Tobago. 
There were 26 lives lost as well as 287,000 tonnes of crude oil released to 
the marine environment. The spill never reached shore and as a result of the 
explosions that followed the collision, most of the oil was burnt off (Read, 
2011). 
 
iv. The Prestige, carrying 77,000 tonnes of crude oil, was severely damaged in 
a storm off the Galician coast of Spain. The ship later split in two and sank 
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spilling tonnes of crude oil which drifted onto Galician beaches and France. 
The tanker continued to discharge oil for weeks after sinking. The 
environmental damage was immediate (García-Mira, Real, Uzzell, Juan and 
Pol, 2006). Prior to sinking and having realized the ship was leaking oil, the 
Prestige had sought refuge to allow discharge of cargo; however, authorities 
in both Spain and Portugal denied it docking rights. The stricken tanker 
could not survive the rough seas and eventually met its fate. This disaster 
drew a lot of media and public attention in Spain, especially since the public 
was directly affected as the oil reached beaches. There was an outcry at 
how this incident had been handled as many felt it could have been averted 
by allowing the stricken vessel into Port (Pulido, 2007). 
 
The demand for energy continues to grow and the tanker fleet continues to grow. In 
2010 the growth in energy commodities demand saw the tanker trade volume reach 
2.767 million tonnes. The increase in demand in 2010 stimulated the new build and 
second hand market (Lun, Himola, Goulielmos, Lai and CHENG, 2013). The amount of 
seaborne oil has increased by an estimated 50% from the late 1980s to now. Common 
sense dictates that the sea is more vulnerable now than during the period between the 
1970s and the late 1980s because of increased fleet numbers and capacity. However, 
the opposite seems to be true as we have seen a dramatic decrease in the number of 
serious incidents involving tankers, especially in the last decade as depicted in Figure 
3.2 (ICS, 2014).  
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Figure 3: Oil spill per decade as percentage of the total spilt between 1970 and 
2009 (Source: ITOPF) 
 
3.2 Operational discharges 
 
Maritime disasters may be described as events, while operational discharges are a 
daily occurrence. Operational discharges can be attributed to human error, poor 
maintenance and deliberate illicit acts. They may stem from broken hoses, defective 
valves, leaks from manifolds and flanges. Poor manning of bunker stations may be the 
cause of oil spills during bunkering (Alexopoulos and Dounias, 2003). 
Deliberate discharges are increasingly becoming a major concern. The United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP-Regional Seas Programme) states that oil discharges 
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from engines, which gather in bilges from day to day operations, rank as some of the 
worst types of pollution. This is mainly because such waste is steady and “occurs 
everywhere” (UNEP, 2014).  
 
Marine pollution through operational oil discharges is estimated at 207,900 tonnes per 
year (bilge and fuel oil sludge + oily ballast residue-fuel tanks + cargo tank washing). 
These discharges consist of oil/oily water collecting in engine room bilges that are 
discharged deliberately at sea. Residues from fuel tanks, cleaning and cargo tank 
washing are also highlighted in the figure mentioned above (GESAMP, 2007). 
 
Coastal states spend huge amounts of money on surveillance and enforcement of 
regulations related to operational discharges. It is important to note that as much as 
human error and poor maintenance are one of the causes of operational discharges, 
intentional discharges remain major contributors. Unscrupulous crew members 
deliberately discharge oil at sea as well as in coastal waters hoping not to be detected. 
Some of these discharges occur during the night when they are difficult to detect. These 
discharges often remain undetected until sea birds, penguins or other marine life are 
washed up in coastal areas. It is for this exact reason that coastal states spend huge 
capital on this issue. To prevent operational discharges requires manpower, advanced 
technology for surveillance and sampling equipment, including surveillance planes and 
vessels. Not all coastal states are able to provide such defences and, as a result, the 
coastal waters are vulnerable to operational discharges. In the Baltic Sea, huge 
resources have also been allocated to combating ship-source oil pollution. Through the 
Helsinki Commission, the region conducts regular aerial surveillance that has resulted 
in a significant decrease in illegal discharges, with ships aware that their illicit polluting 
activities can be detected (Brusendorff, Korpinen, Meski and Stankiewicz, 2014). 
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 3.3 Effects of Vessel - source oil pollution on the marine environment  
 
Oil pollution has an impact on the marine environment. The effects can be both 
immediate and long term. Other than directly impacting the marine environment, oil 
pollution can also affect coastal livelihoods. Oil can affect the marine environment by 
physical smothering, chemical toxicity and, in the long term, loss of key organisms can 
cause ecological changes and, indirectly, through habitat loss, result in elimination of 
species that are very critical for sustenance of the ecology (ITOPF, 2013).  
3.3.1 SHORT TERM EFFECTS  
 
Oil spill effects are influenced by a number of factors, not just the quantity, but the 
weather, season and location of incident are also some of the major factors. For 
instance, a small spill in terms of tonnage in close proximity to a highly sensitive area 
like a Marine Protected Area or bird breeding colony can have detrimental effects. 
Other than being toxic to marine life, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, the components 
in crude oil, are also difficult to clean. Oil can choke animals and stick to the animals’ 
bodies and plumage of birds. Oil slicks can cause breakdown in seabird and mammals’ 
thermal insulation. Sticking to birds’ plumage also inhibits mobility thus affecting ability 
to feed (Hulsey, 2012). 
 
Birds, including penguins, are normally the first prominent casualties during an oil spill. 
They normally prompt a huge response involving clean-up operations and evacuation. 
These costs may run to millions of dollars. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez spilled about 
37,000 tonnes of oil in the sensitive marine environment of Alaska's Prince William 
Sound. An estimated 250,000 seabirds and 2,000 sea otters, including unaccounted 
fish and other marine life, were killed (National Research Council, 2007).  
 
However, spills of small tonnage have caused more damage than those regarded as 
disasters because of the factors alluded to earlier. UNEP GPA (2014) reported that, 
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although the 2,000 tonnes of oil spilled by the Apollo Sea when it sank off South African 
waters in 1994 was a relatively small amount, in reality, it impacted 10,000 penguins. In 
2000, the Treasure spilled half the amount of oil as the Apollo Sea but had double the 
impact with over 20,000 penguins covered in oil and a further 20,000 evacuated. 
3.3.2 LONG TERM EFFECTS 
 
Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), the components of crude oil, are known to 
exist in the sediment and marine environment long after an oil spill. Hydrocarbons in the 
long term cause physiological and behavioural disruptions in certain marine species 
which include altering the reproductive capacity (Hulsey, 2012). 
The coastal communities also suffer long term economic effects as fishing grounds 
might take long to recover. Thomas Shirley, the chair of biodiversity and conservation at 
the Harte Research Institute, which is studying the impact of Deep Horizon spill, states 
that entire generations of shrimp, crab, oysters and other commercially important 
marine life were likely to be wiped out and may require decadal recovery times. The 
impact is not only felt by the ecosystem, but the economy will also be affected for years 
to come. The demand for seafood harvested from the Gulf was likely to be affected 
because of consumer perceptions related to oil spills (Yale Environment 360, 2010). In 
case of the Exxon Valdez disaster, long term effects to the ecosystem were discounted 
since rapid recovery was touted. Contrary to these claims, evidence from scientific 
research conducted over the years has demonstrated that not all affected species and 
ecosystem recovered rapidly. Protracted recovery is particularly evident in near-shore 
food webs. Sea otter recovery rates in areas that had the greatest oiling and sea otter 
mortality were highest. Recovery was non-existent up to year 2000 (Bodkin, 2012). 
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3.4 Legal Regime 
 
Oil Pollution was the catalyst for all maritime regulations. The first International 
Conference on Marine Pollution was held in 1926 in Washington. The conference which 
was attended by 13 maritime nations produced the first International Convention on Oil 
Pollution of the Marine Environment. Even though the convention was not successful, it 
provided an important platform for future conventions. Following the establishment of 
IMCO in 1948, maritime nations converged again under its umbrella to deliberate on 
regulations of oil pollution. In 1954, an important convention was concluded called the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) 
(Gold, 2006).  
The United Nations held its first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958, and 
another in 1960. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
resulted from conferences held in 1973 and 1982. The Convention spelt out 
responsibilities regarding marine pollution. In 1973, the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73) was established after IMCO's 
International Conference on Marine Pollution held in the same year. MARPOL replaced 
OILPOL 54 with its expanded scope (Tan, 2006).  
Subsequent to the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967 which polluted over 190 km of the 
United Kingdom coastline with costs estimated at over $5 million, the first set of 
conventions dealing with liability and compensation were established. In 1969 the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC 1969) was 
established and entered into force in 1975. The International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 
(1971 Fund Convention) was established in 1971 and entered into force in 1978. This 
Convention established the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (1971 IOPC 
Fund) which provides a second tier of compensation in respect of damage exceeding 
the liability under the 1969 CLC. Compensation was subject to an overall monetary cap 
per incident (UNCTAD, 2012). 
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The 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Convention improved on the previous Conventions by 
increasing the maximum amount of compensation, as well as widening the relevant 
geographical scope of application of the Conventions. These Conventions entered into 
force on May 30, 1996. Following the incident involving the Erika in 1999, it was 
apparent that the compensation amounts needed to be increased further. In 2000, the 
compensation levels available under the 1992 Conventions were raised by 50% by way 
of tacit amendments that came into force in 2003. It is important to note that even 
though most of the original Contracting States to the 1969 CLC have adopted the 1992 
CLC and denounced the 1969 Convention, some States have not done so. As a result, 
the 1969 and 1992 CLC co-exist (UNCTAD, 2012). 
The vessel-source oil pollution regulatory framework today not only deals with pollution 
of the environment, but also involves liability and compensation. It has been developed 
into a robust and highly regulatory framework.  
 
3.5 Summary 
 
Vessel-source oil pollution continues to be a major problem. It is encouraging though to 
note that the maritime industry has over the years worked towards minimizing its 
impact. As the statistics have revealed, the number of oil spills and major incidents has 
decreased despite the increase in trade and size of vessels. This positive development 
can be attributed to the well developed and robust legal framework that exists in the 
maritime industry. 
Operational discharges continue to be a problem that unfortunately requires huge 
resources to combat. The shipping industry has taken commendable steps in showing 
commitment towards climate change mitigation. The maritime industry, through the 
IMO, has shown commitment towards decreasing Greenhouse Gas emissions. 
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CHAPTER 4: VESSEL-SOURCE OIL POLLUTION (SOUTH AFRICA) 
4.1 Background 
 
South Africa is the 9th largest country in the continent of Africa. It has a land area of 1.2 
km3. South Africa has a coastline of about 3000km making it the second longest 
coastline in Africa after Somalia. If the vast waters which include the territorial waters 
and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are taken into account, South Africa ascends 
to be the largest country on the continent (SAMSA, 2013). In the words of the South 
African Maritime Safety Authority; 
South Africa occupies a geo-strategic position, a maritime choke point, in the 
Southern Hemisphere, being surrounded by 3 great oceans - the Indian South 
Indian, Atlantic, and Southern Oceans (SAMSA, 2013). 
����������������������������������� 
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South Africa lies in one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes with around 12,000 ships 
visiting the countries' 8 ports annually. In addition, thousands of ships transit through 
South African waters to various destinations (see Figure 4). The coast is home to some 
of the most pristine areas which are rich in biodiversity. The coast is also known for 
providing some of the world’s roughest sailing conditions, making it vulnerable to oil 
pollution (SAMSA, 2013). There is little wonder that the south-western Cape coast is 
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referred to as the "Cape of Storms" and the south-east coast, as the “Wild Coast” 
(Mearns, Olivier and Jordaan, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Shipping routes (source: Bernd Blasius) 
 
 
South Africa has high levels of both terrestrial and marine biodiversity. In fact, 10,000 
species of marine plants and animals have been recorded in South Africa. This equates 
to almost 15% of the known global marine species. The coastal conditions in 
themselves are highly diverse in terms of weather, productivity and oceanographic 
variability among others (DEA, 2014). According to Tunley (2009), there is a total 
network of 22 Government Gazetted Marine Protected Areas (MPA) in South Africa. 
The country has one MARPOL Special Area off the Southern waters. The Special Area 
is located in a busy shipping route and protection of the marine environment is ensured 
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by prohibiting discharge of oil or oily water residues into the sea from vessels of 400 
gross tonnage and above (Tunley, 2009). 
 
4.2 Major vessel-source oil pollution incidents in South Africa 
 
There have been a number of vessel-source oil pollution incidents within South African 
waters over the years, some involving huge amounts of oil and others with less oil 
spilled but far greater impacts on marine species. According to GESAMP (2007), 
between 1997 and 2007 there was a slight increase in estimated accidental oil spills in 
South African waters, although the total estimated number of oil spills each year has 
remained below 20,000 tonnes. Figure 5, puts into perspective the Castillo de Bellver 
disaster when compared to other major international oil pollution disasters. Below is a 
selected list of the major oil spills both in tonnage of oil spilled and effect on the marine 
environment and life. The example below highlights the fact that it is not only large 
crude carriers that are a threat to the marine environment but bunker oil from other 
cargo carriers, when grounded in sensitive areas, can cause problems. Below is a list of 
some of the major incidents to have occurred in South African waters in the last 30 
years (GESAMP, 2007). 
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Figure 5: World’s major oil pollution disasters – all sources (Source: 
Geology.com) 
 
4.2.1 CASTILLO de BELLVER 
 
On 06 August 1983, the Castillo de Bellver laden with 267,000 tonnes of oil caught fire 
(GESAMP, 2007). This was South Africa's biggest oil spill to date and one of the world's 
top 5 maritime disasters involving tankers (see Figure 4.2). The ship was 112 km North-
West of Cape Town when it caught fire. The flame engulfed ship drifted off-shore and 
later broke in two. The stern section with an estimated 100,000 tonnes of oil remaining 
in its tanks sank 24 miles off the coast in deep waters. The remaining bow part was 
towed further away from the coast where it sank. Of the total amount of oil on board, 
approximately 50 – 60,000 tonnes were spilled into the sea or evaporated during 
burning. It is reported that the oil had initially drifted towards the shore but a wind shift 
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subsequently drove it offshore (ITOPF, 2010). The prevailing weather conditions at the 
time of the incident and position of the ship prevented oil from reaching the coastline. 
 
4.2.2 APOLLO SEA 
 
The circumstances surrounding this incident were bizarre and contributed to the 
delayed response that resulted in a loss of life and pollution of the marine environment. 
On the evening of 22 June 1994, there were reports of a suspected oil spill when 
heavily oiled African Penguins were discovered ashore on Dassen Island which is 
situated North West of Cape Town and is a seabird breeding colony. Oil was also 
discovered on the shoreline around the Island. This baffled the authorities as there was 
no reported incident in the area. For at least 3 days after the discovery, the evacuation 
of the penguins was not possible because of extreme weather conditions. The weather 
also delayed responses and any containment efforts. It was not until after a week that 
the source of the pollution was identified. By that time the oil slick had reached some of 
Cape Town's favourite beaches as oiling of the rocky shoreline and sandy beaches 
were observed. The source was identified as the Chinese-owned bulk carrier the Apollo 
Sea laden with 124,000 tonnes of iron ore, which had sailed from Saldanha Bay on the 
20th June 1994. Apparently some 4 hours after departing Saldahna Bay, the ship 
suffered a serious fracture and sank spilling its 2,400 tonnes of bunker heavy fuel. 
Around 1,000 penguins were oiled and half of them died. There was no “May day” call 
sent from the ship, thus resulting in the environmental damage and, most unfortunately, 
the loss of all her 36 crew (Moldan, 1997). 
 
4.2.3 M/V TREASURE 
 
In 2000, the bulk ore carrier MV Treasure sank North of Cape Town between Dassen 
Island and Robben Island. These islands support the largest and 3rd largest colonies of 
African penguins. An estimated 1,400 tonnes of oil was released into the sea. While this 
seems like a small amount, the incident soon developed into a major disaster (Barham 
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et al, 2006). The Treasure had earlier sought refuge in Cape Town after experiencing 
flooding in its number 4 cargo hold. The ship was refused shelter and ordered to sail 50 
miles offshore. Unfortunately, after just 10 miles it sank (Devanney, 2009). 
 
This resulted in one of the biggest penguin evacuations in history. As a result of the 
spill, about 19,000 African Penguins, the majority from Robben Island and Dassen 
Island and a few from around Saldahna Bay were covered in oil. These birds were 
taken to the rehabilitation center run by the Southern African Foundation for the 
Conservation of Coastal Birds (SANCCOB) where they were washed, cleaned and fed. 
Unfortunately, and despite all attempts to save them, close to 2,000 penguins died at 
the rehabilitation center (Barham et al, 2006). The oiled penguins constituted 20% of 
the total species population. The number of affected penguins was even higher and 
estimated at over 40,000. About 20,000 penguins that were not covered in oil were 
removed from the polluted area and relocated 800 km away to Port Elizabeth 
(Crawford, 2000). 
 
4.3 Vessel source-oil pollution (Legal Regime) 
 
This section will look at Conventions dealing directly with oil pollution, in terms of 
prevention, compensation and response. Conventions related to safety, which is also 
vital in marine environmental protection have been deliberately excluded.  
 
4.3.1 LEGAL REGIME (Conventions and regional treaties) 
 
The table below lists International Conventions including Regional treaties relating to oil 
pollution that South Africa is party to or should be party to. 
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TABLE 1: Status of Conventions 
 
 
 
Convention 
 
Year 
Ratified/Acceded 
 
 
Domestic Legislation/Policy 
or aim of the convention 
 
 
 
1. MARPOL   73/78         
 
  
1984 (exc IV & VI)            
 
Marine Pollution (Prevention 
Of Pollution  from ships)(Act 2 
of 1986)  
 
 
 
2. OPRC                                   
 
 
   
 2008 
 
                                                           
 
SANCP complies with OPRC 
 
 
3. CLC 1992                             
 
 
2004 
 
 
Merchant Shipping 2013 
-(Civil Liability Convention) 
Act 
-(International Oil Pollution    
Compensation Fund)  
Compensation Act 
 
 
 
4. IOPC Funds 1992                  
 
2004 
 
 
Merchant Shipping 2013 
-(International Oil Pollution  
Compensation Fund)  
Administration Act 
-(International Oil Pollution  
Compensation Fund)  
Contribution Act 
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5. INTERVENTION 1969 &    
    Protocol 73                                                                                                        
 
1986 
 
 
Marine Pollution(Intervention) 
(Act.No.64 of 1987)
 
 
6. UN Law of the Sea 
convention - UNCLOSC  82 
                                   
 
1997 
 
 
Maritime Zones Act (Act 15 of 
1994) 
 
 
7. London Convention 1972 & 
1996 Protocol 
 
 
 
1972 ratified in 1978 
1996 ratified 1998 
 
 
-Dumping at Sea Control Act 
73 of 1980 
-NEMA: Integrated Coastal  
 Management Act 24 of 2008 
 
 
 
 
8. Nairobi Convention 
 
 
 
2002 
 
 
 
Convention for the Protection, 
Management and 
Development 
of the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the  East 
African                                                             
Region and related Protocols       
 
 
9. Abidjan Convention             
 
2002 
 
                                                       
 
The Convention for 
Cooperation in the Protection, 
Management 
and Development of the  
Marine                                                          
and Coastal Environment of 
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the                                                            
 Atlantic Coast of the West,  
Central and Southern Africa 
Region                                                           
                                                             
 
                                                           
 
 
10. Bunker Convention 2001 
 
Not a party 
 
n/a 
 
Data source: SAMSA, DIRCO, (Yuen & Kumssa, 2011), IMO and Parliament of South 
Africa. 
 
Key:  
 
1. SANCP - South Africa's National Contingency Plan for the Prevention and 
Combating of Pollution from Ships and Offshore Installations 
 
2. NEMA - National Environmental Management Act 
 
3. MARPOL 73/78 - International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships. 
4. OPRC 90- International Convention on oil Pollution Preparedness Response 
and Cooperation.  
 
5. CLC 92 - International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. 
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6. IOPC Fund 92 - The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds  
 
7. BUNKER 2001- International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil 
Pollution Damage 
 
4.3.1.1 MARPOL 73/78 
 
South Africa has ratified MARPOL and only ratified 4 annexures, namely; Annexure I, 
Annexure I & II, Annexure III & Annexure V in 1984. Annexure IV and VI, have not been 
acceded to. The 4 annexures have been enacted into domestic legislation through the 
Marine Pollution (Prevention of Pollution from ships) (Act 2 of 1986). However, the 
matter regarding Annexure IV & VI is currently with parliament after the Portfolio 
Committee on Transport at a seating on 29 July 2014 recommended that the 
Annexures be acceded to and sent to parliament for processing. In suggesting to the 
committee that they approve the two annexes, Ms. Phumelele Ngema, the 
Parliamentary Law Advisor, stated that: 
      
 the two annexes were not a deviation from the other four annexes of the 
Convention. “They both fit into the existing legislative framework”. (Parliament of 
RSA, 2014). 
 
4.3.1.2 OPRC 
 
South Africa ratified the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Cooperation (OPRC 90) in 2008. South Africa's National Contingency 
Plan for the Prevention and Combating of Pollution from Ships and Offshore 
Installations is currently being amended to ensure full compliance with OPRC 90. The 
country was already partly compliant with OPRC through: 
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i. Designation of SAMSA  
ii. Designation of Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre - MRCC (part of SAMSA) 
iii. Smit tugs on standby  
vi. The formulation of the South African Contingency Plan for the Prevention and 
Combating of Pollution from Ships and Offshore Installations (Personal interview [4], 
August 03, 2014). 
 
4.3.1.3 CLC CONVENTION AND IOPC FUND CONVENTION 
 
South Africa had enacted the earlier version of CLC into domestic legislation. However, 
even though the country acceded to the CLC and IOPC 92 in 2004, it has taken over 8 
years to enact the latest amendments into domestic law. The delay in enacting the 
amendments has arguably deprived the country of making claims under the new 
Conventions' updated limits which ensure much higher compensation. South Africa was 
fortunate since there were no major tanker incidents during the period (Cliffe Dekker 
Hoffmeyer, 2013). 
 
The act was finally signed into law during the writing of this paper. However IMO 
Consultants in their Mission Report to South Africa recommended that the proposed 
bills for implementation of both the CLC and the Fund Convention be put on hold. The 
reasons were not substantiated; however, it can be assumed that it was influenced by 
the proposed Merchant Shipping Bill which was to bring together the fragmented 
maritime legislation in South Africa. The recommendations were challenged by The 
Maritime Law Association of South Africa (MLASA). Their primary concern was the lack 
of transparency regarding the recommendations and the cumbersome process (over 8 
years) by which the Bill saw the light of day. The MLASA further argued that delaying 
the bills will deprive the claimants, in the event of a major tanker pollution incident, their 
rights to claim against the Fund. In their view, this will leave the South African 
government vulnerable to litigation (Buabeng and Staniland, 2014; MLASA, 2014). 
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4.3.1.4 BUNKER CONVENTION 
 
South Africa, along with Australia, Canada, Finland, Norway and Sweden, made a joint 
submission to the 75th session of the IMO's Legal Committee on the need for a bunker 
convention. The submission was partly motivated by the UK P & I Club's report 
(Analysis of Major Claims 1993). The report stated that when it comes to pollution 
claims regarding incidents, half the claims involve ships not carrying oil cargo (IMO, 
2001). Interestingly South Africa has not ratified the Convention. South Africa is not a 
party to the Convention. 
 
4.3.1.5 INTERVENTION CONVENTION 
 
The Intervention Convention and the protocol were ratified in 1986 and the law enacting 
it into domestic law is the Marine Pollution (Intervention) Act 64 of 1987. 
 
4.3.1.6 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (UNLOSC) 
 
South Africa ratified the convention in 1997. The country also actively participated in the 
establishment of the International Seabed Authority. The Maritime Zones Act (Act 15 of 
1994) conforms to the regulation with regards to the limits of the territorial sea, 
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf (DIRCO, 2006). All the 
relevant maritime boundaries are defined under the same Maritime Zones Act, ICM Act 
and National Environmental Management Act (Act No. 107 of 1998) (NEMA) (DEA, 
2014). 
 
4.3.1.7 NAIROBI AND ABIDJAN CONVENTIONS 
 
South Africa acceded to both the Nairobi Convention and the Abidjan Convention in 
2002. South Africa's location at the junction of two oceans was the reason for 
participating in these two regional programmes/conventions. Both conventions are 
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concerned with issues of protection, management and development of the marine and 
coastal environment. Of interest to this study is the fact that both have protocols 
concerning co-operation in combating pollution in cases of emergency (OECD, 2013). 
 
4.4 Major Role Players (Legal mandates, operational cooperation) 
 
In terms of vessel-source marine pollution, and particularly oil pollution, there are two 
major players: the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and the Department of 
Transport (DOT) through its agency the South African Maritime Safety Authority 
(SAMSA).  
 
 
4.4.1 THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT (DOT) – SOUTH AFRICAN MARITIME 
SAFETY AUTHORITY (SAMSA) 
 
SAMSA was established in 1998 under the South African Maritime Safety Authority Act 
5 of 1998 and is accountable to the Minister of Transport. SAMSA's stated mission is; 
 
to promote South Africa's maritime interests and development and position the country 
as an international Maritime Centre while ensuring maritime safety, health and 
environmental protection (SAMSA, 2013).  
 
The legal authority for prevention of vessel-source marine pollution rests with the 
Department of Transport which implements the MARPOL Convention, amongst other 
international agreements and domestic legislation. SAMSA, a special agency of the 
DOT, is mandated under the South African Maritime Safety Authority Act (Act No. 5 of 
1998) (SAMSA Act) to deal with matters pertaining to marine pollution by vessels. The 
DOT and SAMSA administers all the relevant Acts pertaining to marine pollution 
prevention from ships (Personal Interview [1], June 24, 2014).    
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After the establishment of SAMSA in 1998, the administration of the Marine Pollution 
(Control and Civil Liability Act 6 of 1981) was designated in terms of the schedule to the 
SAMSA Act No. 5 of 1998. There is, however, a split mandate with regards to 
prevention and combating of oil pollution in terms of the Act. Regarding oil pollution and 
response, the mandate is divided between the Department of Environmental Affairs 
(DEA) and DOT. SAMSA is the agency responsible for the supervision of salvage, oil 
trans-shipment and lightering operations while oil is still within the vessel. SAMSA is 
also responsible for negotiating with owners and insurers of the vessel concerned 
(ITOPF, 2008). In terms of section 52 of the SAMSA Act, the DEA is responsible for 
combating oil pollution. SAMSA, however, remains the overall designated authority 
responsible for marine oil-pollution prevention measures, including administration of 
marine oil pollution legislation. It is in this light that SAMSA has been afforded the lead 
agency role and overall responsibility for responding to pollution from ships as 
stipulated in South Africa's National Contingency Plan for the Prevention and 
Combating of Pollution from Ships and Offshore Installations (SANCP).  SAMSA is also 
responsible for the overall implementation of the plan, and delivers its mandate through 
its 9 business centers (see Figure 6). The National Port Authority is responsible for 
spills designated as tier 1 happening within the ports (DOT, 2007).   
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Figure 6: SAMSA –Business centres (SAMSA) 
 
 
SAMSA also runs the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) which is 
operational 24 hours 7 days a week. As the lead agency, SAMSA, through the MRCC, 
receives distress calls and takes necessary steps to ensure prevention of pollution. 
SAMSA's policy is to ensure that oil is contained within the ship until the ship can be 
towed or refloated to a relatively safe place. The assessment is conducted jointly by the 
MRCC and SAMSA. If it is not possible to move the ship without placing the 
environment at risk, SAMSA ensures that oil is contained and, when safe to do so, 
transferred to another ship or other means of containment. It is important to note that 
the safety of life is a priority during decision-making and the salvage process (DOT, 
2007; Personal Interview [2], July 25, 2014; Personal Interview [3], July 03, 2014). 
 
SAMSA manages a deep-sea salvage tug stationed permanently on the coast. This is a 
key in the armoury for prevention of pollution on behalf of the Department of Transport. 
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The salvage tug is readily available to remove by towing any ship polluting or ship 
deemed a risk. SAMSA's mandate in oil pollution prevention and response can be 
summed up as being responsible for prevention or containing oil while it is in the vessel. 
SAMSA is also responsible for flag state, coastal and port state inspection, ensuring 
that vessels are seaworthy and pose no threat to the environment. The DEA, on the 
other hand, is responsible for combating oil pollution once oil has been released at sea 
(DEA, 2014; DOT, 2007).  
 
4.4.1.1 Sea Watch and Response - MRCC 
 
The Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) was inaugurated in 2007 and falls 
under one of SAMSA'S business units, the Centre for Sea watch and Response (SAR). 
The MRCC’s role in oil pollution prevention is one of an alerting post to agencies that 
deal with prevention and combating pollution. If it detects pollution activity, it 
communicates the information to the relevant authority, which in all likelihood is its 
mother body SAMSA or the Department of Environmental Affairs. The role of the MRCC 
in accident prevention is thus limited. MRCC monitors the coast via the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), but it cannot detect oil pollution. Detection of vessels is also 
limited to those vessels that carry the system. However, in the case of an accident, a 
report is presented to the relevant official at SAMSA, depending on the coast where the 
incident has occurred. A joint assessment is conducted on the best way to contain the 
oil spill (Personal Interview [3], July 03, 2014). 
 
MRCC in itself does not have any assets such as surveillance aircraft or patrol boats. 
While it does have surveillance technology for vessel traffic monitoring in the form of 
AIS, it cannot detect pollution. In South Africa, these assets are lodged with private 
organizations, as well as other government organizations and other government 
departments. Even when the MRCC becomes aware of any illegal deliberate 
discharges, it does not have any enforcement powers. As indicated earlier, it can only 
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act as an alerting post by communicating with relevant units within SAMSA (Personal 
Interview [3], July 03, 2014).  
 
SAMSA has not conducted any emergency drills in the last few years since there have 
not been many incidents to warrant activating the plans (Personal Interview [2], July 03, 
2014). 
 
4.4.1.2 Incorporation of international Instruments to domestic legislation 
 
SAMSA also acts as the technical agency to the DOT in terms of the development of 
regulations pertaining to maritime transport. It facilitates incorporation of IMO and other 
international instruments into domestic legislation and this is accomplished through 
SAMSA's Centre for Policy and Regulation (Personal Interview [2], July 03, 2014). 
 
4.4.2 THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS (DEA) 
 
The Department of Environmental Affairs’ (DEA) constitutional mandate is to: 
      
 Ensure the protection of the environment and conservation of natural resources, 
balanced with sustainable development and the equitable distribution of the benefits 
derived from natural resources.”(DEA, nd) 
 
The department administers legislation, policies and programmes related to 
environmental, protection, conservation and pollution. Some of the relevant legislation 
and programmes among others are National Environmental Management Act (Act No. 
107 of 1998) (NEMA), Integrated Coastal Management Act (No. 24 of 2008) and South 
Africa’s National Coastal Management Programme. When it comes to vessel-source 
marine pollution, the DOT and SAMSA administer all the relevant acts. The DEA does 
provide environmentally-related input where appropriate (Personal Interview [1], June 
24, 2014). 
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In terms of section 53 of the SAMSA Act DEA is responsible for combating oil spills. It 
takes charge as soon as oil is released into the environment, and is responsible for 
coordinating the response action concerning containing and clean-up of oil pollution. 
The objective is always to ensure that action taken does not leave the environment in a 
far worse situation then it would have been if no action was taken. In conjunction with 
SAMSA the DEA approves, oversees and coordinates all activities on site, including 
other role players (DEA, 2014). 
 
For several years, the DEA operated an aerial surveillance service that provided 
support during oil spill incidents. The service also included routine patrols of the 
shipping lanes to look out for any illicit acts of operational discharges that were in 
contravention of MARPOL. According to a senior officer within the department, the 
service is currently under review to take account of new platforms/technologies, among 
other things. At the height of the programme, surveillance aircraft would take 
photographs of the oil slicks and hand them to SAMSA which, in turn, instituted the 
relevant legal action i.e. penalties and fines (Personal Interview [1], June 24, 2014). 
 
The Department has a joint oversight on 6 vessels which were handed over to the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). Four of the vessels are 
patrol vessels and the remaining two research vessels. The primary function of these 
vessels is to conduct scientific research that will inform decisions on sustainable use of 
natural resources as well as enforce fisheries laws. Apart from their fishing patrol 
duties, the vessels are equipped to provide sea rescue and have oil slick breaking 
capabilities. In addition, the vessels carry oil dispersant chemicals used during oil 
pollution incidents. However, administrative issues have meant that these vessels have 
not been able to fulfil their duties since they have been idle and docked for most of the 
time between 2012 and 2013 largely because at some point the management of the 
fleet was handed over to The South African Navy by DAFF. The arrangement hit a snag 
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and never really took off until the contract expired (Parliament of RSA - Research Unit, 
2014). 
 
4.4.3 SOUTH AFRICA’S NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE PREVENTION 
AND COMBATING POLLUTION FROM SHIPS AND OFFSHORE INSTALLATION 
(SANCP). 
 
The purpose of the national contingency plan is:  
 
 To outline national policy for responding to a pollution incident originating from 
vessels and thereby minimizing detrimental effects on the environment (DOT, 2007). 
 
The plans' fundamental and primary aims are to: 
 
(a) Protect human health and safety; 
(b) Minimize detrimental environmental impacts; and 
(c) Provide for the restoration of the environment, as nearly as is practicable, to pre-spill    
      conditions.     
 
In the event of an incident, a response should be formulated according to the following 
priorities: 
 
(a) Human health and safety; 
(b) Natural environment; 
(c) Commercial resources; and 
(d) Amenities (DOT, 2007) 
 
These priorities can be re-prioritized based upon the circumstances surrounding the 
incident as the plan appreciates the fact that no two incidents are exactly the same. 
However, safety of life remains the number one priority during each and every incident. 
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The plan was formulated due to historical facts surrounding maritime incidents, 
prevailing oceanographic conditions, weather conditions and maritime traffic. The 
prevailing conditions and traffic in transit or into South Africa's ports poses a risk of oil 
pollution through accidents and operational discharges (DOT, 2007). 
 
The plan's strategy is determined by the requirements of the Marine Pollution (Control 
and Civil Liability) Act 6 of 1981 and the South African Maritime Safety Authority Act 5 
of 1998. The Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act 6 of 1981 main purpose is: 
 
To provide for the protection of the marine environment from pollution by oil and other 
marine harmful substances, and for that purpose to provide for the prevention and 
combating of pollution of the sea by oil and other harmful substances; to determine 
liability in certain respects for loss or damage caused by the discharge of oil from ships, 
tankers and offshore installations; and to provide for matters connected therewith (DOT, 
2007). 
 
The South African Maritime Safety Authority Act 5 of 1998 determines the roles of the 
major role players and responsibilities of the DEA and SAMSA. The plan does not only 
deal with oil pollution, but also other harmful substances as per the Marine Pollution 
(Control and Civil Liability) Act 6 of 1981. See (Table 2) for duties for SAMSA under 
SANCP. 
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Table 2: SANCP- DEA and SAMSA duties (Source: SANCP) 
 
 
South African Maritime Safety 
Authority 
 
Department of Environmental Affairs 
 
• Take overall charge of the co-
ordination of the prevention and/or 
combating of an incident 
 
• Take control of the technical aspects 
of shipping casualties; 
 
• Supervise oil transhipments; 
 
• Prosecute parties guilty of the 
deliberate discharges of oil; 
 
• Draw up contingency plans relating to 
the control of shipping casualties or 
potential casualties; 
 
• Administer the Acts relating to oil 
pollution; 
 
• Take charge of the legal and financial 
aspects relating to oil spill incidents and 
casualties; 
 
• Control the use of the standby oil 
pollution prevention tug; and 
 
• Co-ordinate and implement coastal 
environmental protection and clean-up 
measures; 
 
• Control the use of the pollution combating 
vessels and surveillance aircraft; 
 
• Control the use of oil spill dispersants; 
 
• Maintain and supply oil dispersant stocks 
and other oil spill equipment; 
 
• Draw up and maintain the DEA&T (now 
DEA) local coastal contingency plans to 
combat oil spills for local authorities; and 
 
• Approve in consultation with SAMSA the 
contingency plans of offshore installations. 
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• Issue pollution safety certificates for 
offshore installations 
 
 
 
 
A number of stakeholders and role-players are involved at various stages, depending 
on the type and severity of the pollution incident and threat (for a detailed list of 
stakeholders and role-players and stipulation of their responsibilities, see Appendix A). 
 
4.4.3.1 Places of Refuge 
 
According to the DOT (2007), South Africa has over the years allowed vessels in 
distress place of refuge along the country's coastline. Each request has been 
considered on its own merits. To this end, SAMSA has developed a policy and 
principles regarding places of refuge, as enunciated below.  
 
4.4.3.1.1 Places of Refuge Policy - Summary 
 
The policy states that consideration should be given to the quay in a port as the first 
place of refuge. However, this is subject to the approval of the National Ports Authority 
(NPA). There should be consultation between SAMSA and the harbour master 
regarding a ship seeking refuge and, taking the environmental impact into account, the 
DEA is consulted to determine the best place to moor the vessel. The owner is 
expected to be open about all the relevant facts, and insurance cover is a prerequisite 
(guarantee cover). In the event of a vessel having suffered structural damage or failure, 
a salvage agreement with the local salvor is requested by SAMSA, with a tug of suitable 
power and appropriate towing gear on standby. SAMSA’s order of priority in deciding on 
the matter will be; safety of crew, pollution prevention, type of cargo, value of the ship 
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and its cargo. SAMSA may form a joint committee to deal with the incident and has 
authority to remove the concerned vessel at any time. 
 
4.4.3.1.2 South African marine oil spill response equipment (as of July 2006) 
 
Under the SANCP, South Africa has a pool of equipment for oil pollution surveillance 
and response (see Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3: Response and surveillance equipment 
 
 
Surveillance Aircraft 
 
 
Response boats/vessels 
 
 
 
-3 x 47m inshore patrol vessels with 
5 000 litre dispersant tanks 
 
-1 x 83m offshore patrol vessel fitted 
with 50 000 litre dispersant tanks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-One patrol/reconnaissance aircraft (Kuswag 
8). 
 
Data Source: SANCP 2007  
 
The SANCP is currently under review to ensure compliance with the International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC) 
(for a full list of equipment and stock see Appendix B). 
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4.5. Chapter concluding analysis and Summary  
 
A. Analysis 
 
SAMSA through DOT has the legal authority for prevention of vessel-source marine 
pollution including enforcement of domestic legislation and international Conventions. It 
has also been made custodian of the SANCP. SAMSA act provides for a split mandate 
with SAMSA retaining preventive duties and the DEA combating responsibilities. This 
allows for possible conflict as the boundaries seem thin. Having two departments 
dealing with such a delicate issue is bound to cause finger-pointing and hamper service 
delivery.  
 
 The issue of surveillance where SAMSA is the Authority that administers MARPOL but 
is not conducting the surveillance itself is also an area that needs to be looked at. The 
DEA is responsible for combating oil spills; an oil slick might be its responsibility but it is 
not the administrator of MARPOL. The DEA was patrolling and taking photographic 
evidence to SAMSA for further action. Operational discharges are released under 
MARPOL and SAMSA has legal authority over it. South Africa, indeed, has not 
experienced major disasters in a long period. However, emergency response drills still 
need to be conducted to ensure the plan is functioning properly. 
 
The DEA is responsible for environmental protection legislation both terrestrial and 
marine. Vessel source pollution, though, falls within SAMSA. The DEA does have a role 
in terms of the SAMSA act via the split responsibility regarding oil pollution. The DEA 
have not been spectators when it comes to vessel source pollution. For several years it 
has been conducting routine patrolling of the shipping lanes, mostly playing a 
supporting role to SAMSA when it comes to vessel oil pollution. The lack of surveillance 
of the shipping lanes and transfer of vessels to DAFF is compromising the country’s 
marine environment. The illicit operational discharge must be flourishing and with the 
marine environment feeling the brunt 
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B. Summary 
 
South Africa indeed lies in one of the world's busiest shipping lanes with treacherous 
sailing conditions. Over the years, these treacherous waters have led to tragic 
consequences for many ships, be it on the "Wild Coast" or the "Cape of Good Storms". 
The country experienced one of the world's biggest maritime disasters with the sinking 
of the Castillo de Bellver in 1983. The Treasure also saw thousands of penguins oiled 
and others affected, resulting in one of the biggest penguin evacuation efforts. It is 
against this background that protection of the environment became a priority for South 
Africa.  
 
South Africa is party to almost all the important oil pollution preventative Conventions, 
and has incorporated many into its domestic legislation. The responsibility for 
prevention and combating of oil spills is divided between the DEA and SAMSA. The 
latter is responsible for the prevention part, while the former is accountable for the 
combating part. The SANCP has clearly delineated the duties of the two departments 
and also identified other stakeholders and role players. 
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CHAPTER 5: SWEDEN 
5.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Sweden is bordered largely by the Baltic Sea and the Kattegat and the Skagerrak. The 
shallow Baltic Sea is one of the largest brackish water bodies in the world. It is 1500 
kilometres long and has an average width of 230km (see Figure 7). As a Large Marine 
Ecosystem, the Baltic Sea is ranked as a Class 1, highly productive ecosystem based 
on SeaWIFS global primary productive estimates. Its coastal areas are feeding, 
spawning and nursery areas for several species of fish (Encyclopedia of Earth, 2011). 
 
Figure 7: Sweden and the Baltic Sea (Source: Denizhaber) 
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Sweden’s vessel-source pollution prevention measures will be viewed with the aim of 
comparing and contrasting with South Africa’s situation. As indicated earlier, South 
Africa’s waters are rich in biodiversity and the country is blessed with pristine beaches. 
For its part, Sweden (together with Finland) has the longest Baltic coast. Sweden, in 
particular, has a number of economic activities that are concentrated along the Baltic 
Sea and a long history of coastal related livelihood (maritime) activities (Tynkkynen, 
2014). 
Apart from Sweden, the other coastal states bordering the Baltic Sea are Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. The total Baltic Sea 
coastal population is about 16 million, and a further 85 million lives within the catchment 
area. Thus, given that the Baltic Sea is shallow and has a limited exchange with the 
Skagerrak and the North Sea, it no wonder that it is extremely vulnerable to pollution 
(HELCOM, 2009).  
Like the South African coast, the Baltic Sea is one of the busiest shipping waterways in 
the world, including other activities. It is projected to be even busier in the next 20 
years, compounding the pressure on the environment. The Baltic Sea currently has 
eutrophication problems in its entirety (WWF Baltic Ecoregion Programme, 2010).  
Currently around 2,000 vessels navigate the Baltic Sea at any given time, and it is 
estimated that 11% of the world’s oil traffic traverses the Baltic Sea. The total cargo 
tonnage in 2008 was 822.4 million, with oil cargo tipping the scale at 251 million tonnes. 
The expectations are that much bigger tankers will be in use, meaning that tankers 
carrying 100,000 – 150,000 tonnes of oil will be a common sight in the Baltic Sea 
(Kosti︠ a︡noy and Lavrova, 2012). 
Clearly both South Africa and Sweden have many reasons for protecting their 
coastlines. It is important to see the extent to which Sweden has been successful in 
doing this, and how far it has implemented some of the international conventions for 
doing so (also see Table 4). 
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5.2 LEGAL REGIME AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
 
Table 4: Status of conventions 
 
Convention 
 
Ratified 
1. MARPOL 73/78                                                             yes and all Annexures 
 
2. OPRC  90                                                              
 
Yes 
 
3. CLC 92                                                                
 
Yes
 
4. IOPC 92 Fund                                                             
 
Yes
 
 
5. UN Law of the Sea convention - 
UNCLOSC  82 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
6. INTERVENTION 1969 &    
    Protocol 73                                                                                                        
Yes 
 
7. Bunker Convention 2001 
 
Yes 
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8.Helsinki Convention                                              
 
Yes, new convention signed 1992 
 
 9. Bonn Agreement                                                  
 
yes, 1969, 1983 
 
10. Ospar   
 
Yes, 1992 
 
Data source: Helcom, IMO, Bonn Agreement 
 
 
Key: 
Ospar - The Convention for the Protection of the marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic 
Helsinki Convention - Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Baltic Sea Area 
Bonn Agreement - Agreement for cooperation in dealing with pollution of the North Sea 
by oil and other harmful substances 
 
5.3 MAJOR ROLE PLAYERS 
 
The major role players in oil-pollution prevention are the Swedish Coast Guard, the 
Swedish Contingency Agency and the Swedish Maritime Authority. 
56 
 
5.3.1 SWEDISH COAST GUARD 
 
The Swedish Coast Guard has as one of its primary duties to work towards achieving a 
sustainable maritime environment. The Swedish Coast Guard goes about achieving this 
by employing preventative measures on reducing oil spills and hazardous substances 
at sea. In the event of an accident, it is the duty of the Swedish Coast Guard to ensure 
that impact is minimized to safeguard the environment (Swedish Coast Guard -
kustbevakningen, 2012). 
The Swedish Coast guard is an independent civil authority that falls under the 
Department of Defense. It has a national responsibility for dealing with oil spills and 
administers and enforces the MARPOL Convention, as well as the National 
Contingency Plan. It operates 26 stations along the coastline (ITOPF, 2013b).The 
Swedish Coast Guard’s mandate is from the Civil Protection Act (2003) which defines  
the different roles of branches of civil society’s rescue services (Bonn Agreement, 
2014). The responsibility extends to the great lakes of Sweden and, at sea, extends to 
the shoreline (Pålsson and Wåhlander, 2013). 
5.3.1.1 Sea Watch and Response 
 
In terms of the Civil Protection Act (2003), for every response operation, there is a 
Response Commander. The commander is granted extraordinary rights to take 
whatever action he/she may deem necessary in order to save lives, property or the 
environment. The following are the requirements for the Coast Guard from the 
government:  
i) measures to prevent the spreading of oil in an accident should be started 
within four hours of receiving notification of the accident; 
ii) recovery operations should be started within eight hours; 
iii) the Coast Guard should be capable of dealing with oil spills of up to 10 000 
tons using national resources; 
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iv) response to chemical accident should be started within four hours; 
v) the Coast Guard should have sufficient capacity for international cooperation 
(Bonn Agreement, 2014). 
 
The coast guard has priorities for response and they are: 
i)  as a first step, to stop the outflow of oil from the vessel; 
ii) as a second step, to stop the spreading of oil on the water surface; 
iii) as a third step, to recover the oil at sea before it has reached the coastal 
zone, the Archipelago and the beaches (Bonn Agreement, 2014). 
 
 
 
5.3.1.2 Oil Spill Response 
 
The Regional Director acts as a commanding officer in charge of the response. The 
continued alarm chain to affected municipalities is guided by a checklist. For large oil 
spills, international help can be sought. The Swedish Coast Guard response to oil spills 
only involves mechanical means; dispersants are not used. With regard to shoreline 
response, the responsibility falls on the local Rescue Service. In terms of the Swedish 
Law, the response phase is complete only when there is no longer an escalation of the 
risk of injury and to property. The Coast Guard owns several vessels, including 3 
multipurpose vessels which are the flagship of the operation. When the response phase 
is completed, the shoreline clean-up is the responsibility of the local municipality 
(Pålsson, 2012). 
Sweden has strategies and policies for dealing with oil spills; however, a more 
operational action plan is still under development (Personal Interview [6], September 
22, 2014) 
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5.3.1.3 Oil Spill Preventative Measures  
 
The Coast Guard has at its disposal 3 sophisticated surveillance aircraft equipped with 
SLAR, IR/UV, FLIR and camera equipment. The aircraft are also equipped with 
sampling buoys which are used to take oil samples (Bonn Agreement, 2014). The 
aircraft logged 2,283 flight hours in 2013 on surveillance duties in the Baltic. Aerial 
surveillance is also conducted jointly in a coordinated effort to curb operational oil 
pollution under the HELCOM Convention (HELCOM, 2014). 
In terms of HELCOM’s Manual on Co-operation in Response to Marine Pollution within 
the Framework of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Baltic Sea Area, parties should endeavour to fly as a minimum twice per week over 
regular traffic zones. This also includes approaches to major ports as well as areas of 
regular offshore activities. Other regions with less traffic or fishing zones surveillance 
should be carried out once a week. The main aim of the flights is detection and 
identification of polluters (HELCOM, 2013). 
The intense surveillance is bearing fruits for the Baltic nations and Sweden. In 2012, the 
number of operational discharges detected dropped by 50%, compared to the previous 
6 years. Ships are aware that their illegal actions are monitored constantly and are 
forced to comply (HELCOM, 2014). 
5.3.1.4 Resources and Equipment 
 
The Coast Guard has the following equipment for surveillance and response, excluding 
manpower and stores (see Table 5). 
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Table 5: Response and Surveillance Equipment – Sweden 
 
 Air Surveillance 
 
Sea surveillance and Response  
 
A. Three surveillance aircraft. For  
 environmental surveillance and support. 
- Aircraft equipped with SLAR, IR/UV, 
FLIR and camera equipment.  
-Equipped with sampling buoys, which 
can be dropped onto an oil spill in order 
to obtain a sample of the oil. 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Twelve environmental 
response vessels 
 
-all equipped with built‐in or cassette advancing 
systems (LORI/LAMOR). 
  
-Equipped with ordinary skimmers, pumps and 
containment booms, and have a storage capacity 
of 100‐1050 m3.  
-The storage capacity can be extended with the 
help of rubber containers and barges. 
 
B. Three multipurpose vessels with high capacity   
Emergency towing, fire-fighting and recovery 
capabilities. At least one, and more usually two, of 
these vessels are always at sea. 
 
 
 Data source: Bonn Agreement (For a full list of equipment and manpower see 
Appendix C) 
 
5.3.1.5 Emergency Exercises 
 
Sweden, under the Copenhagen agreement, Bonn agreement and HELCOM, holds 
annual exercises, although continuous exercises are conducted at the stations where 
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oil response vessels are located There are additional exercises conducted with the 
Swedish Sea Rescue Society that has several stations with "first Aid" booms (200m 
booms) (Pålsson, 2012). 
 
5.4 Swedish Maritime Authority 
 
The Swedish Maritime Authority (SMA) is not directly involved in oil pollution response 
and surveillance. Its involvement with oil pollution is through the administration of 
SOLAS, including inspection of vessels. The Maritime Authority lists as its main service 
the: 
 
(i)  Provision of navigable maritime routes 
 
(ii) Preservation of life 
 
(iii) Preservation of the environment (SMA, 2012). 
 
The primary focus of SMA is commercial shipping, however, consideration is granted 
for leisure boat traffic, commercial fishing and the navy. The Swedish Maritime Authority 
is mandated through government statute (2007:1161). 
 
SMA has 2 subsidiaries, SMA Helicopter Rescue AB which performs Sea and Air 
rescue using rescue helicopters on behalf of the Maritime Authority and SMA Training 
(SMA, 2012; also see Figure 8) for the structure of the Swedish Maritime Authority. 
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 Figure 8: Structure of the Swedish Maritime Authority (Source: SMA) 
 
 
5.5 The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) 
 
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is responsible for assisting 
municipalities in developing response plans. They are an organization involved in 
almost all forms of emergencies and they keep equipment required by municipalities in 
case of an oil spill. They are responsible for oil spill preparedness on land. The MSB is 
under the Department of Defence (Personal interview [4], September 09, 2014). 
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5.6 Places of Refuge 
 
Sweden has no areas specially designated as places of refuge, but places are decided 
upon as and when need arises on a case by case basis. The whole coastline can 
potentially serve as a place of refuge with the merits that the case determines the 
specific location (HELCOM, 2007). 
 
The non-designation of Places of Refuge is contrary to EU Directive 2002/59/EC which 
stipulates that Places of Refuge should be designated. The Swedish Coast Guard is 
aware of suitable places. The decision regarding moving of vessels under distress is 
the competency of the Swedish Transport Agency through Regulation 1980:789. The 
Swedish Coast Guard as the people on the ground are empowered to take a decision in 
the case where the Swedish Transport Agency is unable to take a timely decision 
(Personal interview [6], September 22, 2014) 
 
 
5.7 Chapter concluding analysis and Summary 
 
A. Chapter concluding analysis 
 
The Sweden Maritime Administration does not seem to have any involvement in oil 
spills. Their emphasis is on Search and Rescue and Piloting. The conclusion that can 
be made from the Swedish Maritime Authority Sustainability Report 2012 is that they 
are an organization that is, apart from its primary duty of care, business oriented. There 
is a lot of emphasis on efficiency, improvement of finances and income. Apart from its 
primary responsibility of environmental stewardship and safety of life the maritime 
authority seems to derive a respectable income from its operations.  
 
The Coast Guard is responsible for oil spills. The investment in technical expertise and 
equipment is commendable. It speaks volumes about the amount of value they have 
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placed on the marine environment. It is not uncommon around the world to have 
paramilitary and in some instances military organizations responsible for vessel-source 
marine pollution. The US Coast Guard is the most popular example. It may be argued 
that these groups will protect the environment with their lives as they would when 
protecting citizens. However, the arrangement has its detractors who claim the military 
has no place in such soft duties, which should be left to civilians. 
 
The Swedish Coast Guard is a good example though of a working arrangement that 
ensures the country’s marine environment is protected. Regional collaboration through 
regional bodies like HELCOM ensures that the Baltic Sea as whole is protected. 
Regional bodies like HELCOM allow for pooling of resources ensuring that even 
countries who cannot afford sophisticated equipment like Sweden’s are able to benefit 
through regional collaboration. This ensures that those making huge efforts are not 
disadvantaged by countries that lack capacity. HELCOM also allows uniformity, 
whereby ships are aware that the Baltic Sea in its entirety is monitored, preventing them 
from taking advantage when in waters of those Baltic States of lesser economical 
means. 
 
B. Summary 
 
Sweden has considerable interest in the Baltic Sea and its marine environment. The 
country depends on it for its economic interest and coastal livelihood. It is for this 
reason that Sweden has shown a lot of intent in preserving the Baltic Sea and the 
surrounding marine environment. Sweden is party to a number of regional conventions 
and other efforts to preserve the waters they share with other countries, not just the 
Baltic Sea. The administration of the preventative measures and response to marine oil 
pollution lies with the Swedish Coast Guard, which is part of the Ministry of Defense. 
 
The Maritime Authority is more involved in flag state and port state duties, including sea 
watch and response involving safety of life at sea. The country is also party to almost all 
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the significant oil pollution related international conventions. Sweden has impressive 
technical capability and clean-up response ships for the fight against marine pollution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Gap analysis (Sweden vs South Africa) 
 
The structure of the Maritime administration and ocean governance in Sweden is 
different to South Africa's. The South African Maritime Authority is responsible for all 
traditional roles of a Maritime administration, including oil-pollution prevention and 
response. Even though SAMSA is not directly in charge of the surveillance of shipping 
lanes for operational discharges, it has an oversight. In Sweden, on the other hand, the 
Maritime Administration is not involved in the oil-pollution response and/or surveillance 
of shipping lanes for operational discharges. South Africa’s and Sweden’s coasts are 
almost equal in length, with South Africa’s at about 3000 km, while Sweden’s stands at 
over 3200 km (also see Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 for comparisons of the 2 countries). 
 
 
Table 6.1: Maritime Administration and Conventions 
 
 
 
          South Africa               Maritime Safety Administration         Sweden 
 
 
- Yes 
 
 
Port State Control 
 
Yes 
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-  Yes 
 
Flag State Control 
 
Yes 
 
-  Yes 
 
STCW (Training & licensing) 
 
Yes 
 
-Yes but does not own 
rescue helicopters 
 
Search and Rescue and 
equipment 
 
 
Yes, owns own fleet of 
rescue helicopters 
 
 
-Yes, pass alert 
messages to relevant 
parties 
 
Maritime Coordination Centre 
 
 
Yes, pass alert 
messages and deploy 
team from within 
 
 
-Yes, responsible for 
SANCOP and also 
responsible for preventing 
oil spills 
 
Oil pollution response and 
surveillance  
 
 
 
 
-Passive involvement 
 
                                    Marine Pollution (OIL) Conventions (Ratified: yes or no) 
 
  
 
Yes 
 
 
1. MARPOL 73/78 
 
Yes 
 
      Yes 
 
2. OPRC 90 
 
Yes 
 
       Yes 
 
3. IOPC FUND 92 
 
 Yes 
 
 
      Yes 
 
 
4. UNCLOS 82 
 
 
Yes 
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Yes 
 
5. INTERVENTION 1969 & 
            Protocol 73                                                                                                        
 
Yes
 
 
No 
 
6. BUNKER  
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
7. London Conventions 
 
Yes 
 
-Nairobi Convention 
-Abidjan Convention 
 
8. Regional Conventions 
 
-HELCOM 
-OSPAR 
-Copenhagen agreement 
-Bonn Agreement 
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Table 6.2: Oil spill prevention and response 
 
 
 
South Africa 
 
                   Sweden 
 
1.Split mandate (SAMSA Act) 
 
-SAMSA responsible for preventive 
measures. 
-DEA for combating including clean 
up. 
 
2. SAMSA administers all vessel 
source marine pollution legislation. 
 
 
1. Coast guard mandated by law in terms of 
both    preventive and response. 
 
-Coastal municipality responsible for clean-up 
assisted by the MSB. 
 
 
2. MARPOL administered by the coast guard 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3: Aerial Surveillance for operational discharges & Enforcement 
 
 
South Africa 
 
 
Sweden 
 
1. The DEA for several years operated 
an aerial surveillance service. 
 
-Providing support during oil spill   
incidents. 
- Patrolling of shipping lanes 
-Providing photographic evidence to 
SAMSA for possible legal action. 
 
Service is currently being reviewed 
including looking at new technology. 
Funding tends to be a problem with 
 
1. The coast guard conducts regular 
surveillance missions in the Baltic Sea. Apart 
from their national schedule, in terms of 
HELCOM they are expected to conduct patrols 
at least twice a week and are also involved in 
regional surveillance programmes. 
 
-The 3 Dash 8 Q-300 aircrafts are among the 
world’s most advance surveillance aircraft. 
-Aircraft have sampling buoys which can be 
dropped on the oil spill to take samples 
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aerial surveillance. 
 
 
 
 
2. No satellite surveillance of oil spill 
currently in place. MRCC technology 
cannot detect slicks 
 
2. The European Maritime Safety Agency 
(EMSA) also provides images through the 
CleanSeaNet satellite based oil spill detection 
system 
-Monitoring through CleanSeaNet allows for 
images even at night. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Response capacity and places of refuge 
 
 
South Africa 
 
 
Sweden 
 
-4 vessels under DAFF been out of 
service since 2012 due to 
administration issues 
 
-1 standby tug on standby 
 
 
-Sweden has several vessels (12-13) used in 
response and surveillance including the 3 KB 
series which are the flagships of the response 
programme.  
-The 3 sophisticated vessels are also equipped to 
conduct emergency towing. 
 
-One or two vessels are permanently at sea 
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                                                 Places of Refuge 
 
 
South Africa has no designated places 
of refuge and the ports are not 
obligated to accept vessels in distress 
No designated place of refuge, whole coasts 
potentially a place of refuge, depends on location 
of the ship and its condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
  
The world's voracious appetite for oil is not showing any sign of waning even with the 
advent of new streams of energy sources. The voices against hydrocarbon use as an 
energy source have been growing since the 1970s, reaching a crescendo in the 2000s. 
Yet hydrocarbons remain the major source of energy and maritime transport remains 
the only viable transport of oil across the oceans and between distant countries.  
 
Over the years, we have been constantly reminded of the threat posed by transporting 
millions of tonnes of oil in the oceans. Indeed, some of the major incidents such as the 
Exxon Valdez, Amico Cadiz, Torry Canyon, Prestige and, in the case of South Africa, 
the Castillo de Bellver and the Treasure, have given notice to the dangers of 
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transporting oil through the seas. While this has drawn the world’s attention, ships have 
continued to carry oil since this is the most practical and economical mode of transport 
across the seas. The direction taken has been to strengthen around issues of maritime 
safety regulations, vessel source pollution and compensation.  
 
The maritime industry and maritime nations have come a long way since the pioneering 
International Conference in Washington in 1926. Subsequently, development of 
regulations in the maritime/shipping industry has seen the maritime transport sector 
becoming one of the most highly regulated in the world. The changes have not only 
been on paper, but the oil discharges related to maritime accidents have also been in 
constant decline over the period coinciding with the development of regulations. The 
double-hull design of tankers has been credited with lower discharges of oil into the sea 
during accidents. The regime around compensation (CLC 92) was also developed after 
polluting incidents left governments and coastal communities with astronomical clean-
up bills and other costs such as loss of income. However, tankers are not the only 
threat of oil pollution to the marine environment. Container ships and bulk carriers can 
carry over 10,000 bunker fuels which pose a significant hazard to the marine 
environment. It has also been indicated in this study that the amount of oil involved is 
not the only determining factor of the oil pollution impact. The BUNKER Convention was 
initiated for the same reasons to cover oil pollution incidents, not just those involving 
tankers. 
 
South Africa has had its fair share of vessel-source oil pollution incidents over the 
years, with the Castillo de Bellver being the largest to date in terms of the amount of oil 
involved. The Treasure has probably been the most devastating, with about 50,000 
penguins affected. South Africa, just like the rest of the maritime world, needs to learn 
from these accidents. Sweden has not experienced major oil spills by world standards, 
but the country has nevertheless invested heavily in the preparation for any eventuality. 
Sweden has an impressive fleet of aircraft and vessels for surveillance and response to 
oil pollution. 
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The recently launched Operation “Phakisa” is a sign of a country committed to 
sustainable development. The first implementation of operation “Phakisa” is “Unlocking 
the Economic Potential of South Africa’s Oceans.” Operation “Phakisa” has as its 
priority sectors, among others, marine protection services and ocean governance. It is 
very significant that Marine Protection and Ocean Governance is cited as one of the 
priority sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Recommendations and further research 
 
South Africa has not experienced a major oil spill disaster since the Castillo de Bellver. 
Actually most of the incidents have involved bunker oil from cargo ships other than 
tankers. However, this does not preclude South Africa from preparing for the 
possibilities of disaster, particularly given the traffic and sailing conditions. There are 
many positive steps that are being taken, South Africa's National Contingency Plan for 
the Prevention and Combating of Pollution from Ships and Offshore Installations 
(SANCP) being a case in point. South Africa and Sweden are not at the same level 
economically and in terms of development. Although South Africa is not yet at par with 
Sweden in terms of resources and/or capacity, there are things that can be learned 
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from the latter’s experience. It is on the basis of issues raised in this dissertation that 
recommendations are presented below. 
 
A Maritime Administration 
 
The issue of a split mandate has the potential to cause conflict within departments. 
Senior officials from both SAMSA and the DEA have identified the issue as a grey area. 
The potential conflict may occur when the DEA feels that oil spills could have been 
averted if SAMSA had acted earlier or in particular way. The DEA might cite negligence 
on the part of SAMSA as leading to huge costs being incurred. This might hamper 
working relations between the two departments. It is recommended that: 
 
 SAMSA, being responsible for administration of vessel-source oil pollution, also be 
put in charge of both the prevention and combative mandate, while the DEA 
remains the technical advisor; and, 
 SAMSA creates capacity within the organization for combating oil spills. 
 
Giving SAMSA combating duties as well might motivate its staff to ensure more effort is 
put into ensuring that no oil is spilled from vessels; this does not imply that SAMSA has 
been negligent in the past. 
 
b. Surveillance and Response 
 
South Africa might not have had major tanker oil spill disasters but the country cannot 
afford to rest on its laurels. Incidents like the one involving M/V TREASURE have 
provided a glimpse of the possible consequences should a major oil disaster occur. The 
lack of patrolling of shipping lanes, the fact that there were 6 vessels that were out of 
service for such long periods and lack of oil preparedness drills are all worrying signs of 
complacency. 
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 SAMSA Administers MARPOL in South Africa. Surveillance of shipping lanes 
should also fall within SAMSA. The air surveillance programme must be run by 
SAMSA, which has the legal mandate and enforcement powers regarding MARPOL. 
Funding of aircraft surveillance should be prioritized and the latest technology used. 
The surveillance aircraft might be private, but it should be managed and directed by 
SAMSA. 
 
 The issue of 4 non-operational (dormant) vessels is not only exposing the country to 
the threat of pollution, but also needs to be addressed urgently and vessels allowed 
to conduct their duties, including oil-pollution combating duties. However, fisheries by 
themselves are a big obligation. The author is not convinced that it serves the 
country well to have vessels that are concerned with both oil-pollution and fisheries 
duties. Situating pollution combating duties within the DAFF does not tie with the 
SAMSA Act which has placed preventive and combating responsibilities in the hands 
of SAMSA and the DEA. The latter should have joint oversight over any vessel that 
is involved in oil-pollution prevention and combating duties. The issue of sharing of 
resources between the DAFF and the DEA might be motivated by economic 
interests. Otherwise, the ideal situation is to have a fleet solely responsible for oil 
pollution surveillance, prevention and combating duties placed in the hands of 
SAMSA, in collaboration with the DEA. The vessels under the DAFF can operate as 
backup in case of a major oil spill or when the other vessels are out of commission 
due to repairs or scheduled maintenance. 
 
 Full oil spill preparedness drills involving all stakeholders should be conducted at 
least annually to ensure that all role-players are ready for any eventuality.  
SAMSA is the lead agency in this regard and should ensure that drills are 
conducted 
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 Collaboration with Neighbouring coastal States in Oil spill surveillance is 
recommended as that will allow for pooling of resources and ensures a wider 
coverage in terms of oil pollution surveillance. 
 
 SAMSA should have full authority when it comes to places of refuge. Ports by their 
very nature are commercially driven. Therefore, leaving the decision to the port is not 
in the best interest of the country as Ports might tend to look into their own interests 
first. SAMSA arguably looks after South Africa’s interests and is better positioned to 
make an informed and balanced decision that will accommodate all stakeholders. 
SAMSA must involve the Port and the DEA during its decision-making process but 
the final word must rest with SAMSA. Ports should not be compromised or 
disadvantaged. The author proposes that a fund be instituted by the government to 
provide guarantees or cover for Ports in case of ships sinking in the channel or 
breaking up within the Port’s limits and causing pollution. Such incidents might lead 
to the halting of port operations for longer periods until the vessel is removed or the 
oil spill contained or cleaned up. The Fund would ensure that Port Authorities are not 
prejudiced and would also motivate Ports to accept stricken vessels, thus avoiding 
unnecessary incidents that might cause pollution of larger areas of the coast. 
 
 This might appear as if SAMSA is being burdened with extra duties; however, 
SAMSA is already an organization that has shown tremendous growth since 
2008. SAMSA has also taken responsibility for the maritime domain and is 
currently investing in capacity building. In the circumstances, an expanded 
SAMSA might not be a far-fetched idea. A civilian unit formed along the lines of 
the Swedish Coast Guard at SAMSA, working alongside the DEA, will ensure 
consolidation of resources, while also creating employment. The unit can be 
modelled on the DEA’s green scorpions. With South Africa in the oil exploration 
stage, it will be in line with Operation “Phakisa” to institute radical changes in the 
country’s oil-pollution prevention regime. Oil exploration to exploitation will mean 
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more vessels in the waters. It will be proper for the country to be ready to meet 
oil pollution threats posed by oil exploration and its logistics. 
 
 
 
c. Conventions 
 
Delay in ratifying and enacting conventions into domestic law has potential to tarnish 
the country’s image. South Africa is a well-respected country in the international 
community and many look to it for inspiration. The delay in promulgating regulations, as 
was the case with CLC 92 updates and the Fund convention, needs to be rectified. The 
8-year delay has put the country at risk in the event of a major oil disaster. In the 
circumstances, the compensation for damages would have been limited to the lower 
limits afforded by the previous Convention. 
 
 MARPOL ANNEXURE IV AND V1 should be ratified and enacted into domestic 
law as there does not seem to be a valid reason why it was not done in the first 
place. 
 Despite being one of the sponsors of the BUNKER Convention, South Africa 
has not ratified the convention. It is therefore imperative that the country ratify 
the Convention if its citizens are to benefit from the Convention’s compensation 
regime. 
 There is a need to identify a mechanism that ensures the smooth ratification, 
enactment and updating of International Conventions between DOT, SAMSA 
and the legal fraternity. 
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d. Further research 
According to the author, there is a need for further research in the following areas: 
• The formation of “blue scorpions” with full capabilities similarly to the Swedish Coast 
Guard  within SAMSA, with regard to dealing with vessel-source oil pollution 
surveillance and enforcement duties; and, 
• The expansion of SAMSA to take more responsibilities in the maritime domain, 
particularly regarding vessel-source oil pollution i.e. pollution fleet, surveillance duties. 
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                                  APPENDICE A 
APPENDIX 1 List of stakeholders and role-players in the SANCP 
 South African Petroleum Industry Association 
• Ship Owner 
• Terminal operator or installation operator 
• Provincial Departments of Environmental Affairs; South African National Parks; 
South African Museum; South African National Defence Force; Prince Edward 
Islands Management Committee 
• Local authorities which include among others, provincial, municipal, parks, 
environmental, museum, traffic, health, labour, etc. 
• Disaster management authorities 
• National Ports Authority (NPA)  
• Chemical industry National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) 
• Salvors 
• Smit Amandla Marine 
• Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (Now Department of Water and 
Sanitation) 
• South African Defence Force  
• South African Police Services 
• SANCCOB 
• Local environmental agencies, wildlife organizations and related NGOs 
• South African Weather Service  
• Home Affairs  
• Customs and Excise 
• Service providers, such as, OPCSA, Drizit, HAZMAT, Oil Spill Response Ltd. 
(OSRL), the International Tanker Owners Federation (ITOPF), etc. (DOT, 2007). 
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Source: (SANCP, 2007) 
                                            APPENDIX B 
SOUTH AFRICAN MARINE OIL SPILL RESPONSE EQUIPMENT 
The equipment and its location is all listed in the SANCP. Some of the stores are with 
the Government Departments, National Port Authority as well as the private sector. The 
list below consists of all the stores that are with the Government Departments. 
(Updated July 2006) 
 
1. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS & TOURISM 
 
• 3 x 47m inshore patrol vessels fitted with 5 000 L dispersant tanks, carrying 
Chemserve OSE 970 concentrate and breaker boards 
• 1 x 83m offshore patrol vessel fitted with 50 000 L dispersant tanks, carrying 
Chemserve OSE 750 
• Oil spill dispersant stocks (L):  
-Cape Town tanks: 59 200 (Chemserve OSE 750) 20 000  (Chemserve OSE 970) 
-Durban tanks: 39 350 (Chemserve OSE 750) 
• One patrol/reconnaissance aircraft (Kuswag 8). 
• Booms 
14 x 25m Portboom 
30 x 25m Seaguardian boom 
5 x 25m Shoreguardian boom 
7 x 10m Shoreguardian boom 
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1 x 20m Riverboom on reel 
• Skimmers 
2 x T-disc skimmers 
1 x Rotadisc 15 skimmer 
1 x Desmi Ocean skimmer (detachable Desmi DOP 250 Archimedes screw pump). 
• 1 x 25m³ Aristock inflatable floating tank 
2 x 10m³ Fastanks  
1 x 4m inflatable boat with 2 x 60hp engines 
1 x Drum-vac unit 
• 1 x Karcher high pressure water washer 
 
2. SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY – SIMONSTOWN 
• 2 x 20.5m tugs fitted with 4 000l dispersant tanks & side arm spray booms. 
• 1 x 20t/hr Ro-clean rope-mop skimmer (Seamop 5060) 
• 1 x 20t/hr Ro-clean disc skimmer 
• 400m Ro-clean roboom 1000 (0.43 x 0.36m) on reels with powerpack 
 
Apart from the equipment that is with the Navy and the Department of Environmental 
Affairs, South Africa has access to the equipment within the National Port Authority, 
Engen, SAPREF, Petro SA, Oil pollution Control SA, as well as at other Oil spill 
response service providers. 
Source: (SANCP, 2007) 
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                                               APPENDIX C 
 
Sweden Oil spill response equipment and manpower 
 
Resources 
• +The Coast Guard has about 70 emergency responders specially trained and 
equipped for scuba diving, response to chemicals and fire‐fighting on board. 
• The Coast Guard also has a special agreement with municipal fire brigades along the 
coast according to which each of the fire brigades has agreed to assist the Coast Guard 
in an accident at sea with a MIRG 
• (Maritime Incident Response Group) team of six firemen. These firemen are specially 
trained for actions on board ships and for deployment from helicopter together with light 
equipment. The Coast Guard should provide immediate assistance to the helicopter in 
the form of heavy equipment such as hoses, foam-cooling capability and everything 
needed for a protracted operation. 
 
• The Coast Guard operates three surveillance aircraft. For environmental 
surveillance and support in an oil spill situation, the aircraft are equipped with 
SLAR, IR/UV, FLIR and camera equipment. They are also equipped with sampling 
buoys, which can be dropped onto an oil spill in order to obtain a sample of the 
oil. The three aircraft have a total flying time of approximately 3000 hours per 
year 
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• The main body of the resources for environmental response consists of twelve 
environmental response vessels, all equipped with built‐in or cassette advancing 
systems (LORI/LAMOR). These vessels are also equipped with ordinary 
skimmers, pumps and containment booms, and have a storage capacity of 100‐
1050 m3. The storage capacity can be extended with the help of rubber 
containers and barges. 
 
• The Swedish Coast Guard operates three multipurpose vessels with high 
capacity emergency towing, firefighting and recovery capabilities. At least one, 
and more usually two, of these vessels are always at sea. 
 
• For shallow water operations in the archipelago, there are twelve units equipped with 
brushskimmers. These are designed for transportation by lorry or by aircraft/helicopter. 
 
• For rapid containment of oil, the Coast Guard has seventeen sea‐trailers, each 
carrying 500 metres of booms strategically allocated along the coastline. These sea‐
trailers are designed for lorry transportation to an appropriate port near the accident. 
The trailer can be launched into the water directly from the lorry and can be towed to 
the site at a speed of up to 30 knots. 
 
• The Coast Guard has approximately 16 000 metres of “RoBoom high sea booms”, 
“Expandi 4300 coastal booms” and NOFI 600S. The Coast Guard also has a number of 
skimmers, containers and transfer pumps. For backup and assistance in an operation 
the Coast Guard has over thirty cutters and around sixty smaller workboats. 
• For oil recovery operations, most of the response vessels have special air filters and 
an overpressure system which is used when operating in hazardous atmospheres, thus 
allowing the crew to work inside the ship without carrying gas masks etc. One vessel is 
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equipped with filters to protect the interior of the ship against different hazardous gases 
in case of an incident involving chemicals. 
 
• Response on shore – Municipalities and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. The 
local fire brigades of the municipalities are required to have a certain capacity for beach 
cleaning and harbour spills. In the case of larger spills, the Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency has allocated two larger equipment stores at strategic locations. These stores 
support the local fire brigades with different types of beach protection and cleaning 
devices, such as light booms, tarpaulins, pumps, protective clothing, brushes and 
buckets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
